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RUSSIAN POLICY IN CHINA, 1858 - 1917

BOSTON UNIVERSITY

GRADUATE SCHOOL

Thesis

RUSSIAN POLICY IN CHINA, 1858 - 1917

by

Florence Edna Durgin

(B.S. in Ed., Boston University, 1922)

submitted in partial fulfilment of  
the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Arts

1934



RESEARCH REPORT

RESEARCH REPORT

1964

RESEARCH REPORT IN CHEMISTRY - 1964

p7831

by

James E. H. Jones

Ph.D. in Chemistry, University of Illinois

Submitted to the Department of Chemistry  
for the Ph.D. degree in Chemistry  
at the University of Illinois

1964



## RUSSIAN POLICY IN CHINA, 1858 - 1917

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## INTRODUCTION

The Far East today claims the attention of students of politics, statesmen, scholars and the general public as never before. It has become a storm center of world politics involving as it does the interests of most of the Great Powers, and the immediate future of the great Empires of Russia, China and Japan.

The writer of this thesis seeks to throw some light on the complicated problems of the Far East by a study of Russian policy, particularly as it effects the interests of China and Japan. Following a survey of the Russian expansion in Siberia to 1858, the author undertakes a detailed study of Russian policy between 1858 and 1917.

To understand the events of this period one must definitely realize that the Russian policy was defined by ministers who were responsible only to the autocratic Czar and who in fact often enunciated a personal policy of their own without let or hinderance by any such institution as cabinet responsibility or loyalty. Indeed it was not uncommon for one minister in the cabinet to be diametrically opposed to the policy of another. Hence it was difficult for foreign countries to determine just what the Russian policy actually was on problems of international concern. In order to decide what attitude to adopt toward Russia, at any given time, it was often necessary for the foreign country to determine which minister happened to be most influential at the Russian court at that time.



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In general, most Russian ministers accepted the policy of establishing as many buffer states as possible along the frontiers of the Empire as a measure of security against foreign invasion. Throughout the nineteenth century, Russia had little difficulty in setting up such buffer states along her Eastern frontiers for the newly acquired territories did not seriously effect the interests of other great powers.

During the second half of the nineteenth century, however, as opposition to Russian eastward expansion stiffened, it was found necessary to adopt two other policies of expansion. One method was the granting of aid to neighboring states for which Russia later demanded compensation. A second policy was one of watchful waiting, for the purpose of exploiting the weakness of neighboring states during periods of internal crises. All these methods of expansion might have resulted in making Russia the most powerful Empire in the Far East were it not for the determined opposition of rival European powers and Japan.

In view of the increased opposition of foreign powers there developed a wide difference of opinion among groups of ministers and statesmen in Russia itself as to the proper course that ought to be followed in the Far East. One group, following a policy of aggressive imperialism, demanded occupation and exploitation of Manchuria, while other ministers, desirous of avoiding war, sought Russia's advantage in that region by peaceful methods of cooperation and conciliation. After a struggle the imperialist faction gained control. They refused



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to evacuate Manchuria, leased Port Arthur and forced the opponents of Russia to combine against her in self defense.

The policy of the imperialist faction at the Russian court, as carried out in Mongolia and Manchuria between 1905 and 1917, illustrates how imperialists, in order to defend their position in the buffer states often changed their policy from aggression to conciliation without waiting to be influenced by public opinion.

"In short," says Bau,<sup>1</sup> "the Russian policy was imperialistic, unscrupulous and opportunistic." A study of Russian policy will help us to judge as to the truth of such statements.

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1. Bau, "Foreign Relations of China," p. 4



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IN SIBERIA

1581-1891







## II. EARLY PENETRATION OF RUSSIA IN SIBERIA, 1581 - 1858

### Peaceful Expansion and Contacts with Manchus

Russia became interested in the lands beyond the Ural Mountains in the sixteenth century as a result of Yermak's expedition to the Obi River. When this group of adventurers first started out they had no backing from the Russian government for Russia was primarily interested at that time in developing routes which would establish contact with western Europe. Although Yermak was an outlaw and therefore could not expect aid from Russia, he continued his conquests until he reached the Obi River where he captured the Mongol town of Sibir. The conquered territory Yermak later offered to the Czar in order to recover his standing with the government.<sup>1</sup> Russia accepted the territory now that the power of the Mongols had been broken and heaped great honors upon Yermak, the adventurer and conqueror.

Russian administration in Siberia brought little change to the natives for they simply paid tribute to the Czar instead of to the Tartar chiefs, as before. The new rulers, sent out by Russia, had as their only aims private gain and the creation of fortunes for themselves, to be gained by either legal or illegal means. Russian

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1. Lattimore, "Manchuria, the Cradle of Conflict," p. 113



Pioneering Expansion and Contacts with Manchuria

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expansion continued peacefully, however, as the graft that existed was no worse than it had been under the Tartar chiefs. New settlements were made by the Russians and the towns of Tiumen and Tobolsk were founded in 1586 and 1587, respectively. Although these towns were really ruled from Moscow,<sup>2</sup> Tobolsk was made the nominal center of the administration in Siberia.

Expansion into Eastern Siberia was continued by the Russians, who by 1619 had reached the Yenissei River and in 1637 had established Fort Yakutsk on the Lena River. From this time on Russian expansion across Siberia tended to shift southward towards the Amur valley. By 1651 Khabarov had reached the Amur River and had sailed down the river to the Pacific. He built a fort at the junction of the Amur and the Ussuri rivers where later a city was built called Khabarovsk.<sup>3</sup>

Russian expansion into the Amur region brought them into contact with the Chinese and trouble developed at Albasin, an outpost on the Russian frontier. The Russians were defeated by the Chinese in 1658<sup>4</sup> and for a time were driven out of the Amur territory. During the 1680's, however, the struggle for control of the Amur valley was renewed but in 1689 the two countries decided to settle their differences by a treaty of peace.

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2. Golder, "Russian Expansion in Pacific, 1641 - 1850," p. 18

3. Williams, "History of China," p. 232

4. Vladimir, "Russia on the Pacific," p. 132



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3. Golubev, "Russian Expansion in Pacific, 1641 - 1850," p. 18

3. Williams, "History of China," p. 232

4. Vladimirov, "Russia on the Pacific," p. 122

China was mainly interested in making an agreement which would secure her from possible invasions by Russian adventurers, but was not especially desirous of retaking the territory in which the Russians had settled. According to Lattimore,<sup>5</sup> it was traditional Chinese statecraft to discourage any extension of Chinese population northward and at this time there was no desire to occupy the territory north of the Amur.<sup>6</sup> Yakhontoff likewise claims that, "From the correspondence between the Emperor Kwang-Hsi (1622-1721) and the Czar of Moscow, one can see clearly that the Chinese Emperor did not consider the regions adjoining the Amur River as belonging to his crown." China, therefore, willingly sent messengers to Nerchinsk to consider an agreement with Russia over the Amur territory.

#### Treaties of 1689 and 1727, Followed by Further Expansion

In the negotiations of Nerchinsk, Russia suggested that the Amur River would be an excellent boundary between Russia and China. Obviously if Russia should succeed in obtaining the Amur boundary it would give her control of all the places along the left bank of the river which would enable her to keep in touch with the fortress at the outlet to the Pacific. It would also allow her to build up a strong protection at the mouth of the Amur. She was unable to gain these advantages, however, for the Treaty of Nerchinsk, 1689, which

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5. Lattimore, p. 108

6. Yakhontoff, "Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East," p. 13



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S. Lastovets, p. 108

S. Yekhonovskiy, "Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East," p. 13

was the first treaty ever signed by China and a European power, legalized the existing situation by leaving the lands north of the river to the Russians, but excluded them from the use of the river while jurisdiction over the territory east of the Ussuri was left undecided. The treaty regarded the two countries as equals for each nation was granted the right to have its subjects, guilty of offenses in the territory of the other country, returned to judges of their own nations.<sup>7</sup> Subjects of either nation could come and go across the frontier on private business and could carry on commerce if they had the proper passports.

Neither country realized the importance of the Amur valley. China did not appreciate the importance of the foothold Russia had acquired by this treaty, while the latter did not realize how much she was losing by her failure to acquire control of the Amur River. Russia was not in a position to enforce her claims, for at this time China was strongly under the control of the Manchus who had just conquered the country; the Russians were a long distance from home where there was very little interest in the situation anyway; and a poorly organized authority was trying to settle and develop the territory north of the Amur.<sup>8</sup> In spite of difficulties, Russian authority succeeded in keeping peace with the natives and in encouraging the settlers to develop trade.

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7. Williams, p. 233

8. Vladimir, p. 136



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7. Williams, p. 333

8. Vladimirc, p. 106

To avoid future trouble over trading relations, Russia and China signed a commercial treaty at Kiakhta in 1727 by which commerce was regulated and boundaries fixed. Earlier trade had been carried on by caravans going across the desert of Mongolia to Peking. Now the commercial treaty made provision for an exchange of goods on the frontier, resulting in the development of the trade center of Kiakhta on the Russian side and Maimachen on the Chinese side of the boundary. All trade was carried on by means of barter for the use of money was forbidden. This treaty also gave Russia the right to send priests of the Greek Orthodox Church to remain permanently at the legation and to send students to Peking to study the Chinese language for the purpose of becoming interpreters for the Russian government.<sup>9</sup> After this treaty Russian ambassadors had great influence in Peking and Russian merchants, who were on better terms with the Chinese than other merchants, gradually received more and more privileges.

Due to this increased influence of the Russians in China and the development of permanent settlements in Siberia by Russian emigrants the Russian government began to take a more real interest in the Far East. This interest was greatly intensified when England began to expand her power in China. As a result of the war between China and England in 1842, England had forced China to open up five ports from which Russia was excluded. Previous to 1842 Russia was the

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9. Williams, p. 237



To avoid future trouble over trading relations, Russia and China signed a commercial treaty at Khabarovsk in 1858 by which commerce was regulated and boundaries fixed. Earlier trade had been carried on by caravans going across the desert of Mongolia to Peking. Now the commercial treaty made provision for an exchange of goods on the frontier, resulting in the development of the trade center of Khabarovsk on the Russian side and Manchou on the Chinese side of the boundary. All trade was carried on by means of barter for the use of money was forbidden. This treaty also gave Russia the right to send residents of the Greek Orthodox Church to reside permanently at the frontier and to send students to Peking to study the Chinese language for the purpose of becoming interpreters for the Russian government. After this treaty Russian ambassadors had great influence in Peking and Russian merchants, who were on better terms with the Chinese than other nations, gradually received more and more privileges. Due to this increased influence of the Russians in China and the development of permanent settlements in Siberia by Russian emigrants the Russian government began to take a more real interest in the Far East. This interest was greatly intensified when England began to expand her power in China. As a result of the war between China and England in 1842, England had forced China to open up five ports from which Russia was excluded. From 1842 to 1858 Russia was the

only country that had had international agreements with China. As the power of England increased Russia feared the encroachment of England or some other European power up in the Amur River territory. To guard against this possibility Russia sent Nicholas Muraviev to Eastern Siberia as Governor of the territory. Muraviev was a far-sighted man and realized the value of further expansion, the necessity of navigating the Amur, and of gaining control of its outlet to increase the value of the river to Russia. Muraviev, with the aid of Nevelskoy, who had been appointed head of an expedition to explore the Amur, continued the expansion. Sakhalin was discovered and occupied and the mouth of the Amur River was claimed by Russia when Nevelskoy raised the Russian flag at the mouth of the river, an act which was approved by the Czar in 1850.<sup>10</sup>

Muraviev, who at this time was fearing an attack by France and England on the Pacific during the Crimean War, used the Amur River to transport troops, equipment and supplies to the coast. A French attack from the Pacific was defeated by the Russians and so Muraviev's plan for the control of the Amur had been proven to be practical and Russian interests in fortifications and in securing navigation of the Amur increased. From this time on Muraviev determined to gain rectification of the boundary by making the Amur River the frontier line.

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10. Yakhontoff, p. 20



only country that had had international agreements with China. As the power of England increased Russia feared the encroachment of England or some other European power up in the Amur River territory. To guard against this possibility Russia sent Nicholas Muraviev to Eastern Siberia as Governor of the territory. Muraviev was a far-sighted man and realized the value of further expansion, the necessity of navigating the Amur, and of gaining control of its outlet to the ocean. He realized the value of the river to Russia. Muraviev, with the aid of Novitskiy, who had been appointed head of an expedition to explore the Amur, continued the expansion. Gorkhain was discovered and occupied and the mouth of the Amur River was claimed by Russia when Novitskiy raised the Russian flag at the mouth of the river, an act which was approved by the Czar in 1850.<sup>10</sup>

Muraviev, who at this time was fearing an attack by France and England on the Pacific during the Crimean War, used the Amur River to transport troops, equipment and supplies to the coast. A French attack from the Pacific was defeated by the Russians and so Muraviev's plan for the control of the Amur had been proven to be practical and Russian interests in Transbaikalia and in securing navigation of the Amur increased. From this time on Muraviev determined to gain recognition of the boundary by making the Amur River the frontier line.

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<sup>10</sup>. Yakovlev, p. 30

Settlements were made in 1855 on the lower Amur, four on the right bank and one on the left,<sup>11</sup> and by 1856 the river was practically under Russian control. The next step was to get China to sanction and recognize the control, so in 1857 Russia sent Admiral Putiatin to negotiate with Peking authorities on the boundary question. He was refused admission at Kiakhta and so sailed down the Amur and went by sea to Peiho and Shanghai where at both places he was refused admission. In spite of this attitude on the part of the Chinese, Muraviev continued his explorations and settlements with the final aim in mind of obtaining more treaties to legalize Russia's new position in the Far East.

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11. Yakhontoff, p. 238

1. F. S. Hall, "The Revolt of Asia," p. 136

2. 1864

3. Gervie and MacGill, "Far Eastern International Relations," p. 172



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## 111. RUSSIAN EXPANSION THROUGH FRIENDSHIP AND ALLIANCES, 1858 - 1898

### Treaty of Aigun

The treaty of Nerchinsk which had held for 160 years without amendment, had maintained peace between the neighboring countries. Russia, however, during this period had gradually increased her influence in China. Russian embassies, the only white people allowed at Peking,<sup>1</sup> had visited the court of China; a Russian market had been established in Peking where the legation had their headquarters; a Russian church had been organized and a Russo-Chinese language school to train diplomats had been founded in Peking.<sup>2</sup> Since the treaty of Nerchinsk, Russia had also taken over the control of the Amur valley as a result of the explorations of Muraviev and Nevelskoy and because of the victories of the Russians in the Pacific during the Crimean War (1854-1856).

China, on the other hand, was in a much weaker position than Russia in 1858. She had been defeated by England in the Opium War in 1842 and in 1858 she was being threatened with another defeat at the hands of England and France in the second foreign war of 1856-1860. During this war with England and France, China was also endeavoring to keep control over the Taiping rebellion (1850-1864) which had threatened to overthrow the dynasty in China.<sup>3</sup>

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1. J.W. Hall, "The Revolt of Asia," p. 135

2. Ibid

3. Morse and MacNair, "Far Eastern International Relations," p. 172



# Treaty of Aigun

The Treaty of Nerchinsk which had held for 100 years without amendment, had maintained peace between the neighboring countries. Russia, however, during this period had gradually increased her influence in China. Russian embassies, the only white people allowed at Peking, had visited the court of China; a Russian market had been established in Peking where the Legation had their headquarters; a Russian church had been organized and a Russian-Chinese language school to train diplomats had been founded in Peking.<sup>1</sup> Since the Treaty of Nerchinsk, Russia had also taken over the control of the Amur valley as a result of the actions of Kurlov and Kovalevsky and because of the victories of the Russians in the Pacific during the Chinese War (1894-1895).

China, on the other hand, was in a much weaker position than Russia in 1858. She had been defeated by England in the Opium War in 1842 and in 1859 she was being threatened with another defeat at the hands of England and France in the second foreign war of 1856-1860. During this war with England and France, China was also endeavoring to keep control over the Taiping rebellion (1850-1864) which had threatened to overthrow the dynasty in China.<sup>2</sup>

1. J.W. Hall, "The Revolt of Asia", p. 132

2. Ibid

3. Morse and Michels, "The Eastern International Relations", p. 172

For these reasons Russia was in a good position to befriend China and to obtain, as a result, all that Muraviev wished. He had aimed for some time to get China to sanction Russian control of the territory he had explored, and to grant Russia the legal right to navigate the Amur River. As China was in no position to refuse anything while she was being threatened by the Taiping rebellion at home and the Anglo-French blockade from outside, Muraviev took the opportunity to propose to China the first of three treaties which Russia succeeded in obtaining by 1860. So Muraviev, in the spring of 1858, was asked by Chinese officials to confer with Prince Yishan, commander-in-chief of the forces, and a few days later, in May 1858, the treaty of Aigun was signed. This treaty gave to Russia the territory on the left, or north bank of the Amur River from the mouth of the Argun to the mouth of the Amur. The territory on the right as far as the Ussuri was recognized as Chinese, but the territory between the Ussuri and the sea, south of the Amur River, was to be held by both countries until the question of a boundary could be settled. The Amur, Sungari and the Ussuri rivers were to be open for navigation to both Russian and Chinese vessels, but no vessels of other countries were to be allowed to navigate these rivers. The Manchu inhabitants on the left bank of the Amur were allowed to be under Chinese authority. Trade across the border was to be permitted but no regulations were prescribed except that officials of both countries were to mutually protect traders of Russia and China on either bank of the river.<sup>4</sup> This treaty stimulated the ambition of

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4. V.H. Yakhontoff, "Russia and the Soviet Union," p. 352



For these reasons Russia was in a good position to defend China and to obtain, as a result, all that Muraviev wished. He had aimed for some time to get China to surrender Russian control of the territory he had explored, and to grant Russia the legal right to navigate the Amur River. As China was in no position to refuse anything while she was being threatened by the Teling rebellion at home and the Anglo-French blockade from outside, Muraviev took the opportunity to propose to China the first of three treaties which Russia succeeded in obtaining by 1858. The Muraviev, in the spring of 1858, was signed by Chinese officials to counter with Prince Yixian, commander-in-chief of the forces, and a few days later, in May 1858, the treaty of Aihun was signed. This treaty gave to Russia the territory on the left, or north bank of the Amur River from the mouth of the Argun to the mouth of the Amur. The territory on the right as far as the Ussuri was recognized as Chinese, but the territory between the Ussuri and the sea, south of the Amur River, was to be held by both countries until the question of a boundary could be settled. The Amur, Sungari and the Ussuri rivers were to be open for navigation to both Russian and Chinese vessels, but no vessels of other countries were to be allowed to navigate these rivers. The Russian inhabitants on the left bank of the Amur were allowed to be under Chinese authority. Trade across the border was to be permitted but no regulations were prescribed except that officials of both countries were to mutually protect traders of Russia and China on either bank of the river. This treaty stimulated the ambition of

Russia for further expansion of her power in the East.

### Treaty of Tientsin

The treaty of Aigun had been negotiated by Count Muraviev, governor-general and administrator of Eastern Siberia, but Putiatin, who had finally arrived at Hongkong,<sup>5</sup> and the representatives of France, England and America, were negotiating at the same time for a commercial treaty in order to acquire privileges of trade by sea. Putiatin desired for Russia the privilege of trade at the treaty ports which had previously been opened to the other powers. He was in a better position than the representatives of other powers for the feeling of the Chinese was less antagonistic toward Russia than toward the French and English, who had been carrying on military operations in China. Also the treaty of Aigun, which had just recently been signed, strengthened the position of Putiatin and so the Russian treaty, signed on June 13, 1858, was the first of the series of commercial treaties between China and European countries.

By this treaty of Tientsin Russia obtained the right to trade at Shanghai, Ningpo, Foo-chow-fu, Amoy and Canton, all of which had been opened to other European countries in the treaty of Nanking with England, and in the following treaties with America and France.<sup>6</sup> In addition to using these ports, Russia was allowed to trade at Taiwanfu in Formosa and Kiungchow in Hainan. The treaty confirmed the right of Russia to send envoys from Kiakhta to Peking by any route through open cities or ports

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5. See p. 11

6. Treaties between 1842-1844, after Opium War



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5. See p. 11

6. Treaties between 1858-1860, after Opium War

of China and due respect was to be shown them on arrival; the Russian government was given the right to appoint consuls in all ports opened for trade and could send warships to support the authority of the consuls and to maintain order among the Russian subjects living in the ports; the personal safety of Russians living in China, and the security of their property was guaranteed; no cases arising between Russian and Chinese subjects in the open ports were to be examined or judged by the Chinese government except with the cooperation of a Russian consul or a representative of the Russian government in the district. One other important gain for Russia appeared in Article XII<sup>7</sup> which provided that: "All the rights political, commercial and other privileges that may in the future be acquired by the countries most favored by the Chinese Government, shall be extended to Russia as well, without any further negotiations on her part." In the following treaties with the other European countries eleven more ports were opened, tariffs were revised, and protection granted for Christian missionaries. These rights, as well as many others in the European treaties, were granted automatically to Russia because of this most favored nation clause in Article XII.

While these treaties were being arranged, Count Muraviev had been surveying the coast of the Ussuri region and soon after the signing of the treaties the war between China and the foreign powers broke out again. These two facts led to a third treaty between Russia and China within three years.

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7. Yakhontoff, p. 355.



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### Treaty of Peking

The treaties of Tientsin provided for signature at Peking but the Chinese Commissioners at Shanghai insisted that the ratifications should be exchanged there. The foreign ministers refused to enter into negotiations there and started for Peking. When they arrived at Taku they found that the Russian representatives had already completed the ratification of their treaty at Peking, but that the forts at the mouth of the river had been strengthened and the river closed to transportation by a boom. The Chinese claimed the ministers could reach Peking by landing farther up the coast and then going by land across to Peking, but the British and the French considered the blocking of the river an insult, and while attempting to remove the obstacles, drew on an attack from the forts in which the Europeans were defeated. This occurred the last of June, 1859, and during the rest of the year negotiations were carried on between England and France resulting in the sending of reinforcements for the allies. In March, 1860, the two governments sent an ultimatum to Peking, but as China absolutely refused the ultimatum, the foreign war was renewed and the Taku forts captured on August 21, 1860.

Meanwhile Muraviev, surveying along the coast of Ussuri, had selected the site of Vladivostok and had occupied it on July 20, 1860. Russia, who had been watching for an opportunity, now took advantage of the situation in China and General Ignatiev, posing as a friend of China, convinced her that the condition was dangerous and that she ought to settle the difficulties before the war was carried too far. He also



## Treaty of Peking

The terms of the Treaty of Peking provided for a number of other provisions. The Chinese Commissioners at Shanghai insisted that the ratifications should be exchanged there. The foreign ministers refused to enter into negotiations there and started for Peking. When they arrived at Tientsin they found that the Russian representatives had already accepted the ratification of the Treaty of Peking, but that the forts at the mouth of the river had been strengthened and the river closed to transportation by a boom. The Chinese claimed the ministers could reach Peking by landing further up the coast and then going by land across to Peking, but the British and the French considered the blocking of the river an insult, and while attempting to remove the obstacles, drew on an attack from the forts in which the Europeans were defeated. This occurred the last of June, 1860, and during the rest of the year negotiations were carried on between England and France resulting in the signing of ratifications for the allies. In March, 1860, the two governments sent an ultimatum to Peking, but as China absolutely refused the ultimatum, the foreign war was renewed and the Tientsin forts captured on August 21, 1860.

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urged the foreign powers to withdraw from Peking and then, claiming that he had saved the dynasty of China, asked her for a recognition of these services in the form of a signature to a treaty which ceded to Russia the territory east of the Ussuri River which Muraviev had already occupied. Thus Russia had gained, through diplomacy and no expense, the valuable territory south of the Amur, called Primorskaya, as well as the port of Vladivostok.<sup>8</sup>

This treaty of Peking, signed in November 1860 by Prince Kung, who was then in control of the Peking government, ceded to Russia, besides the territory east of the Ussuri River, the region adjacent to the lakes of Balkhash and Issik-kul. The boundary line between Siberia and Russia was adjusted and the Russians were granted the right to trade in all parts of the Empire; barter trade was authorized between the citizens of the two countries along a custom free boundary and the merchants of both countries were to be given special protection by the local border officials of both countries; Russian merchants were given the privilege of traveling from Kiakhta to Peking for commercial purposes and anywhere in China for trading purposes if they had the proper documents; <sup>and</sup> the Russian government might appoint consuls to Kashgar and Urga as well as at Ili and Tarbagati for supervision over the merchants and for the prevention of misunderstandings between merchants and the local population.<sup>9</sup>

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8. Morse and MacNair, "Far Eastern International Relations," p. 229

9. Yakhontoff, p. 357 - 360



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parts of the Empire; barrier trade was authorized between the citizens of the two countries along a custom free boundary and the merchants of both countries were to be given special protection by the local border officials of both countries; Russian merchants were given the privilege of travelling from Kishina to Peking for commercial purposes and anywhere in China for trading purposes if they had the proper documents; the Russian Government might appoint consuls to Kashgar and Urumchi as well as at Ill and Tashkent for supervision over the merchants and for the prevention of misunderstandings between merchants and the local population.<sup>9</sup>

8. Morse and MacNair, "Far Eastern International Relations," p. 329

9. Yakovlev, p. 357 - 360

After the signing of the treaty of Peking, Russia built up Vladivostok as a naval base, made the Amur a Russian river by protecting it with a chain of fortresses, and started colonization on the right bank of the Ussuri for the region had fertile soil, good harbors and a mild climate. The colonization, however, was slow due to Russian problems at home, their conquests and wars in the Near East and in Central Asia, and to poor transportation.

In gaining possession of the Amur and of the sea coast, Muraviev completed the work of Yermak who had started Russian expansion through western Siberia. The boundary line fixed by this treaty remained the same for thirty years, but access to the Pacific brought on a desire for more ports and during that thirty years Russia, as she turned toward the south, overstepped the Amur boundary both commercially and politically.

#### Russia in Kuldja

Soon after Russia had succeeded in gaining territory north of the Amur River by the treaty of 1860, she again used the same policy of claiming friendship and giving aid to China in order to try to gain more territory on another frontier. Sinkiang, between Mongolia and Tibet, was one of China's western provinces and it had been under Chinese control for over two hundred years. The territory in this province was hard to keep intact when the government of China was weak. During the Taiping Rebellion, 1850-64, rebellions broke out in this province and in the northern part of Ili under Mohammedan leadership and Yakub-Beg had become conqueror and ruler of western Turkestan. The central



After the signing of the Treaty of Peking, Russia built up Vladivostok as a naval base, made the Amur a Russian river by protecting it with a chain of fortresses, and started colonization on the right bank of the Ussuri for the region had fertile soil, good harbors and a mild climate. The colonization, however, was slow due to Russian programs at home, their conquests and wars in the Near East and in Central Asia, and to poor transportation.

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#### Russia in Korea

Soon after Russia had succeeded in gaining territory north of the Amur River by the Treaty of 1858, she again used the same policy of claiming friendship and giving aid to China in order to try to gain more territory on another frontier. Manchuria, between Mongolia and Tibet, was one of China's western provinces and it had been under Chinese control for over two hundred years. The territory in this province was hard to reach indeed when the government of China was weak. During the Taiping Rebellion, 1850-54, rebellions broke out in this province and in the northern part of it under Mohammedan leadership and Yaku-Hsu had become conqueror and ruler of western Turkestan. The central

government of China could not resist the new control.

Russia was very much interested in the situation as a strong trans-frontier trade had been built up between Russia and China during the middle of the nineteenth century at Kuldja and Tarbagatai. In 1851 a convention had been signed providing for the presence of a Russian consul and allowing a Russian settlement in Ili.<sup>10</sup> The agreement also regulated the trade between Russia and China, but in 1863 the rise of the Dungari tribe expelled the Chinese representatives from a large part of Kashgaria and then the insurrection under Yakub-Beg increased and spread. In 1871, fearing for the safety of their trade, Russia moved troops into Kuldja and occupied the territory on the ground of anarchy prevailing in Kashgaria and that it was becoming a menace to Russian interests.<sup>11</sup> At the same time she did this, she promised China that the occupation was temporary and that the territory would be restored to China whenever she was able to hold it against the Mohammedan conquerors; at that time it seemed improbable that that condition could occur and Russia seemed to be getting a strong foot-hold in the Sinkiang province.

However, in 1867 Tso Tsungtang had been given the task of retaking the territory that had been conquered by the Mohammedans. Tso Tsung-tang was a man of great simplicity but he was a stern disciplinarian; he was a great general but used the policy of punishing rebellious cities by carrying on great massacres and atrocities.<sup>12</sup> For ten years he waged

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10. J.P. Bland, "Li Hung-chang," p. 189

11. J. P. Bland, p. 190

12. Morse and MacNair, p. 341



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10. A. F. Bland, "Li Hong-chang", p. 189

11. A. F. Bland, p. 190

12. Morse and MacNair, p. 241

wars and won campaigns which carried him through all of northern Sinkiang, in which he then re-established Chinese rule, and in July 1878, after Turkestan had been reconquered, the Russian government was informed that China was ready to take over the administration of Ili and that they were sending an envoy to St. Petersburg to arrange the matter. Russia, however, was unwilling to give up her hold on the territory that she had so easily gained. Russia claimed that China had been too weak to control her outlying possessions and that was why it had become necessary to send in troops to maintain order. The envoy from China, Chunghow, was not a diplomat and after nine months he came to terms by drawing up the treaty of Livadia which was signed September 15, 1879.<sup>13</sup> By this treaty Russia and was to evacuate Kuldja, Chinese sovereignty was to be restored, but the western and richer part of Ili was to be ceded to Russia and she was also to receive great trading privileges in western China. Her caravans could go across from Eastern Turkestan into China as far as Hankow without payment of duties or likin charges. In addition, China was to pay Russia five million roubles to pay for the expenses of administration during the occupation. Chunghow did not realize the great value of the territory he had granted to Russia and when he returned to China, he met with great opposition because of the treaty he had made. He was removed from office and the opposition grew so strong that later he was condemned to be executed while China refused to sign the treaty.

Feeling was very strong in China. Many favored war as Tso Tsung-tang had a strong force of sixty thousand troops trained by the

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13. Morse and MacNair, p. 342



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Feeling was very strong in China. Many favored war as Tso Tung-tang had a strong force of sixty thousand troops trained by the

ten years of conquest in Sinkiang and he was anxious to use them against the Russians. China bought munitions, hurriedly collected troops and built up defenses, for Russia also was preparing for war by sending ships and men to the Chinese coast. But finally a new ambassador was appointed to Russia. Marquis Tseng, the Chinese ambassador at the Court of St. James, was ordered to St. Petersburg in July 1880, to try to make new arrangements with Russia. The new ambassador was in a difficult position because of the previous failure of Chungchow, and because of the division of feeling in China between the war party, led by Prince Chun and the Empress Regent, and the peace party, led by Li Hung-chang, who realized the strength of Russia.<sup>14</sup> Marquis Tseng first induced China to lift the punishment of Chungchow, for it would have meant the losing of the sympathy of all the Powers and it would make Russia more antagonistic, then he reopened negotiations with Russia.

China was conservative and only with difficulty could be made to give up what she regarded as her own territory.<sup>15</sup> China was anxious to recover Kuldja for it meant that in Russian hands it would be an open door into Sungari, and although Turkestan itself was not valuable, China's policy was to surround herself with buffer states for protection against aggressive neighbors. Russia tended to be aggressive and refused as long as possible to give up what she had once gained.<sup>16</sup> The problem of Marquis Tseng was to find a solution which would save the pride of China

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14. A.S. Krausse, "Russia in Asia," p. 177

15. R.S. Gundry, "China and her Neighbors," p. 207

16. Ibid., p. 207



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14. A.S. Kravtsov, "Russia in Asia," p. 177

15. A.S. Connerly, "China and her Neighbors," p. 207

16. Ibid., p. 207

and partly satisfy the demand of Russia.

He informed Russia that the treaty of Chungchow could not be ratified and found the Russian government favorable to further negotiation. The Chinese demands were reasonable and Marquis Tseng had good diplomatic ability; although he had to work under conflicting instructions coming from the war party and peace party which followed each other in power, yet after six months he succeeded in obtaining a new treaty, signed February, 1881. By this Treaty of St. Petersburg, Russia gave back the valley and the command of the passes in Tien-shan and also part of Ili. The trade advantages Russia had received by the Treaty of Livadia were limited. The caravans from Eastern Turkestan could not go on to Hankow and freedom from duties outside the Great Wall should cease as soon as the cities had recovered from trouble enough to set up customs houses or as soon as the trade became large enough to make a customs tariff necessary. Russia was given the right to open up consulates in certain cities of Turkestan and Mongolia and in these towns and trading areas there should be free trade between Russian and Chinese subjects. Russians had the right to settle and purchase real estate for the purpose of carrying on trade. The indemnity China was to pay Russia was increased from five million to nine million roubles because the Russian occupation of Kuldja had been prolonged and the cost of occupation had been increased due to the unsettled condition of the territory.

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triumph."<sup>17</sup> China had gained through diplomacy rather than war. Russia, however, still held a strip of Chinese territory in Sinkiang and she had had ten years of systematic study of Chinese Turkestan which had been surveyed by scientists sent from St. Petersburg,<sup>18</sup> and the indemnity was large. The rights of Russian consuls and subjects in Ili had been secured and the rights of the traders had been increased.

Russia now turned her attention toward railway expansion in the Far East and laid the basis of a control which at first aided her peaceful economic expansion but later became one of the causes of an aggressive policy.

#### Trans-Siberian Railway

During Russian expansion toward the Pacific the rivers of Siberia had been of great value for both transportation and communication, but as expansion continued, the colonists settled farther south where the territory was more fertile and the climate more favorable, and this brought about the necessity of better connections by roads. During the early part of the eighteenth century postal roads were in use in Western Siberia and fortnightly service was established between Moscow and Tobolsk, but in Eastern Siberia the conditions of the country were not so favorable to the development of communication; more hilly country and marsh lands presented obstacles to road building while Lake Baikal, which it was necessary to cross if a water route was developed,

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17. Morse and MacNair, p. 344

18. Krausse, p. 178



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17. Morse and MacGill, p. 244

18. Kravtsov, p. 178

was subject to severe storms.<sup>19</sup> By the middle of the nineteenth century projects were being suggested for the building of railways to aid communication in the East, but plans for long lines were given up and only short lines for commerce were built. During the last half of the century lines had been built to connect the navigable rivers, and by 1884 a rail and water route was complete as far as Tiumen,<sup>20</sup> but due to frozen conditions during the winter and the many reloadings that were necessary, it did not prove to be a very valuable economic project.

A plan for a Trans-Siberian railway was drawn up as early as 1858 but lack of capital and initiative had prevented any development of the scheme. In 1890 the idea of a railway extending all the way across Siberia was again suggested. The necessity for transportation to the Pacific seemed greater than before for the Amur and the Ussuri territories had been taken by Russia, Vladivostok had been built up, and petitions were being presented to the Czar to have European Russia connected with the Pacific by railway. After favorable reports had been presented to the Czar he appointed a commission to consider the recommendations. As the Congress of Berlin had recently blocked Russian expansion toward the Mediterranean, the Czar favored the project and in 1891 quite willingly issued a rescript to build the railway.

The railway was to be built by dividing the route into seven sections and work was to be started at both ends at once. The Ussuri

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19. Vladimir, "Russia on the Pacific and the Siberian Railway," pp. 273-274

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
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# RAILWAY DEVELOPMENT

1891-1899

- completed Railway
- Railway Projects







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The aim of building the line was not only to develop trade and the natural resources of Siberia, but to further the Russian policy on the Pacific, for the completion of the railway would give to Russia a commanding place in the growing struggle for supremacy in the Far East. The railway also led to a still greater desire for expansion for, after building the Ussuri branch, and after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, Russia felt the great handicap of trying to depend upon Vladivostok, which was not open the year round, for a naval harbor. This situation led her to look farther south to Port Arthur for an ice-free port and caused her to watch with serious interest the outcome of the Sino-Japanese War. If Japan should defeat China she might take Port Arthur and gain a valuable foothold in Manchuria.

#### Sino-Japanese War

In the spring of 1894 domestic strife in Korea attracted the attention of both China and Japan. Japan proposed to China that the two powers cooperate in an effort to reorganize Korean government. China refused, but Japan notified China of her intention to act alone. The situation became more serious, Japan strongly favored progressive reform while China opposed progressive reform and favored a conservative

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government in Korea. This conflict of policies between the two countries eventually brought on the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. During the war Japan captured the fortress of Port Arthur and finally China was obliged to sue for peace.

China intrusted Li Hung-chang with the responsibility of securing the best terms possible from Japan and the treaty of Shimonoseki was signed April 17, 1895. By this treaty China was to recognize the independence of Korea. She was to cede to Japan the full sovereignty of Formosa, the Pescadores Islands and the part of Manchuria east of the Liao River, which was called the Liaotung Peninsula. China was to pay to Japan an indemnity of 200 million taels. She was also to open four more treaty ports, Shasi, Chungking, Suchow and Hangchow, and open to traffic the waterways leading to the ports.<sup>22</sup> The treaty was ratified at Chefoo on May 8. A later treaty of commerce, provided for in the treaty of April, 1895, was signed at Peking, July 21, 1896. This treaty included the most-favored-nation clause, or the granting to Japan of all rights that had been granted to any of the Western Powers. It gave to Japan the right to carry on trade, industry and manufacturing at any treaty port.

The intervention of Japan in Korea and China encouraged and paved the way for further Russian aggression. Count Witte felt, that if Japan succeeded in establishing herself on the mainland as she aimed to do in the treaty of Shimonoseki, she would block his policy of peaceful

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22. Morse and MacNair, p. 407



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penetration, undermine the achievements of the previous century and threaten the future of Russia in the Far East. Russia had long desired the Liao-tung Peninsula and if Japan should succeed in taking this territory Russia would be pushed northward to the Siberian ports, which were not open to trade during the winter season. It would be best for Russian interests to have a strong, but passive China, but to maintain this condition China would have to remain unchanged in territory and no power could be allowed to increase its territorial possessions in China.<sup>23</sup> Count Witte, therefore, convinced the Czar that Russia could not afford to allow Japan to get a foothold on the continent. While Russia was probably not intending at this time to take all Manchuria, she saw the possibility of a partition of China by the Great Powers and determined to prevent Japan or any other aggressive power from acquiring territory that bordered on her newly started Trans-Siberian railway.<sup>24</sup> So the Czar took definite steps to interfere with the settlement made in the Shimonoseki Treaty by calling a special committee on Sino-Japanese affairs. On March 30, 1895 this committee drew up the following conclusions:<sup>25</sup>

(1) To seek to preserve the status quo ante bellum in northern China and in pursuance of this to advise Japan, at first amicably, to desist from the occupation of southern Manchuria, for such an occupation would injure our interests and would be a constant menace to the peace of the

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23. Witte, "Memoirs of Count Witte," p. 83

24. G.N. Steiger, "China and the Occident," p. 47

25. Witte, p. 84



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83. Witte, "Memoirs of Count Witte," p. 83

84. G.M. Hodge, "China and the Occident," p. 47

85. Witte, p. 84

Far East; in case of Japan's refusal to follow our advice, to declare to the Japanese Government that we reserve to ourselves freedom of action and that we shall act in accordance with our interests.

(2) To issue an official statement to the European Powers and to China to the effect that while on our part we do not seek any seizures, we deem it necessary, for the protection of our interests, to insist on Japan's desisting from the occupation of southern Manchuria.

Prince Lobanov realized that Russia could not interfere alone successfully, so he suggested interference to the European powers on the plea that the Japanese possession of Manchuria would menace the security of capital invested in China and endanger the policies of the European nations in China. England, who had earlier suggested interference, now refused, but France and Germany joined to make up the Three Power Intervention. In initiating the Three Power Intervention, Russia, who had been more successful than other countries in maintaining cordial diplomatic relations with the court of Peking, used her previous policy of posing as a friend to China and prevented Japan from acquiring a part of Chinese territory. This aid to China, Russia stressed later when she wished payment for this intervention.

In April, between the signing of the treaty of Shimonoseki and its ratification, the Russian, German and French governments presented to the Japanese foreign office notes stating that it would be dangerous to the peace of the Far East for her to take the Liaotung Peninsula and strongly advising her to give up the claim to the Manchurian territory. Meanwhile Russian, French and German warships had been enter-



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ing eastern waters ready for action and Russia was preparing to mobilize her army. The demand was not entirely unexpected by Japan as two Japanese leaders, Count Ito and Count Matsu, had advised against taking the territory in the first place but had been obliged to give in to the military party.<sup>26</sup> It was impossible for Japan to stand out against these demands as they felt the Powers were prepared to enforce their advice if necessary. Japan was exhausted by her campaigns and her financial resources had been drained so she was obliged to accept the terms and sign a new agreement. By this agreement signed on November 8, 1895, Japan exchanged the Liaotung Peninsula, with all fortifications, arsenals and public property, for an increase in the indemnity of 30 million taels, making a total indemnity of 230 million taels. This treaty was ratified at Peking on November 29, 1895.

Russia and France saw no reason why they could not gain diplomatic influence in China as a result of their interference and the chance came when China had to meet the payment of the indemnity. Count Witte, again posing as a friend of China, and loyally supported by Prince Lobanov, offered the services of Russia to China by making a loan to help China pay her indemnity. An agreement was signed on July 6, 1895 between the Russian Ministry of Finances and a group of six French and four Russian banks, to make to China a thirty-six year loan of 400 million francs at four per cent interest. The loan was to be secured by Russian resources and Count Witte arranged for the transaction on

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#### Russo-Chinese Bank

The Sino-Japanese War had shown the military inefficiency of the Chinese and how keen the competition among the Powers for concessions and spheres of interest was becoming. Russia was the first country to take a new step to gain power in China; she did this by forming the Russo-Chinese Bank. It was done partly to fulfill the promise made to France to help the banks which had aided in making the loan to China and partly to help the exploitation of the situation in the Far East in the interest of Russia.<sup>28</sup> Through the bank, Russia had a chance to gain railway and mining rights in Manchuria. This exploitation was later called the conquest by "bank and railway."

Count Witte was very influential in founding this bank which was chartered by Russia under Russian laws in December, 1895, but which had as its chief shareholders, French financiers. Thus the Bank was nominally a Russian corporation, but the real founders were four of the banks of Paris and many of the financial leaders of France. The

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27. Witte, p. 85

28. H. Parlett, "A Brief Diplomatic Account of Events in Manchuria," p. 7



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bank started with a capital of 11,250,000 roubles and the Chinese government made a permanent investment of 5,000,000 taels.

The President of the Bank was Chinese, but he was a mere figure-head. The charter provided for a Board of Directors of eleven, to be elected by the shareholders and confirmed by the Minister of Finance of Russia, and for the Managing Directors, who were to be chosen from the Board of Directors. The active managers were mostly Russians under the supervision and direction of Count Witte and his finance department.<sup>29</sup> Branches of the Bank could be established in Russia or abroad. The bank was to begin <sup>operating</sup> six months after the sanction of the charter and was to continue indefinitely.

The aims of the Russo-Chinese Bank were to develop commercial relations with the Eastern Asiatic countries and its powers were very broad. It could discount commercial paper, receive deposits, buy and sell goods and stock, collect duties for the Chinese Empire, could coin money with the authority of the Chinese government, pay loans of the Chinese government and acquire concessions for the establishment of the construction of railways and telegraph lines in China.

"It may be said that the bank was created to take advantage of the more favorable relations created between Russia and China resulting from the intervention and Russia's guaranty of the Chinese loan."<sup>30</sup>

Both Russia and China invested heavily in the bank at first but

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29. S.A.Korff, "Russia's Foreign Relations during the Last Half Century," p. 58

30. P.H.Clyde, "International Rivalries in Manchuria," p. 49



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29. S.A. Kozlov, "Russia's Foreign Relations during the last half century," p. 28

30. F.H. Gilder, "International Rivalries in Manchuria," p. 49

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#### Russo-Chinese Secret Treaty, 1896

Li Hung-chang, who was the virtual head of the Chinese Foreign Office, had been in office in Tientsin for over thirty years. He had come in contact with all persons having business with the government. "His ability in handling foreign affairs was universally recognized." ..... "In the field of diplomacy, so far as the European Government's representatives were concerned, Li was to all intents and purposes the Chinese Government personified."<sup>31</sup> In 1895 at the suggestion of Count Ito of Japan, Li Hung-chang was appointed envoy to that country to settle the question of peace after the Sino-Japanese War.<sup>32</sup> The Czar of Russia later sent a personal request to the Chinese Emperor asking him to entrust Li Hung-chang with the position of Ambassador and in March, 1896, Li was appointed to represent China at the coronation of the Czar at Moscow. It was during this visit to Russia that the Li-Lobanov Secret Treaty of May, 1896 was signed.

Li Hung-chang, since the Sino-Japanese War, was generally afraid of the antagonism of Japan, but did not fear Russia and preferred to depend on Russian help. The menace of Japanese aggression was more

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31. Bland, p. 77

32. Ibid, p. 179



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31. Ibid., p. 77

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formidable than that of Russia so Russia was now in an ideal position to capitalize the aid and friendship which she had recently given to China. Count Witte's plan was to secure from China the right to continue the Trans-Siberian Railway, which had been completed as far as Transbaikalia by 1896, straight across Manchuria. He felt that this branch would be more economical and much less difficult to construct while the Amur branch, which had been planned, would not only be too expensive, but would also build up too much competition for the Amur Steamship Company. The shorter route would also possess the advantage of passing through a more productive area and more favorable climate which would give Russia great economic advantages. Witte's problem was to get China's permission for the plan by a peaceful agreement based on mutual commercial interests for he had always upheld the idea that the Trans-Siberian Railway had no military or political designs but was planned as a purely economic enterprise and should, under no circumstances, be allowed to serve as a means for territorial expansion.<sup>33</sup>

At the coronation of the Czar, therefore, Count Witte, after reminding Li Hung-chang of Russia's recent service to his country, tried to convince him that, as the integrity of China might at any time be threatened by Japanese aggression, a railway across Manchuria would be absolutely necessary if Russia was to render assistance to China. He also argued that the railway from Chita to Vladivostok would help solve the problem of poor transportation in Manchuria and in addition

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33. Witte, p. 87



favorable than that of Russia's as Russia was now in an ideal position to capitalize the aid and friendship which she had recently given to China. Count Witte's plan was to secure from China the right to construct the Trans-Siberian Railway, which had been completed as far as Transbaikalia by 1900, straight across Manchuria. He felt that this branch would be more economical and much less difficult to construct than the Kiam branch, which had been planned, would not only be too expensive, but would also build up too much competition for the Kiam Steamship Company. The shorter route would also possess the advantage of passing through a more productive area and more favorable climate which would give Russia great economic advantages. Witte's problem was to get China's permission for the plan by a peaceful agreement based on mutual commercial interests for he had always upheld the idea that the Trans-Siberian Railway had no military or political designs but was planned as a purely economic enterprise and should, under no circumstances, be allowed to serve as a means for territorial expansion. At the conclusion of the Czar, therefore, Count Witte, after reminding Li Hung-chang of Russia's recent service to his country, tried to convince him that, as the integrity of China might at any time be threatened by Japanese aggression, a railway across Manchuria would be absolutely necessary if Russia was to render assistance to China. He also argued that the railway from China to Vladivostok would help solve the problem of poor transportation in Manchuria and in addition

would help China by raising the productivity of the territory.

Li Hung-chang, realizing the dangers of the proposal, was unwilling to agree. He knew this agreement would open up Manchuria to Russian economic and political penetration and he realized the real aim of Russia was not to defend China against Japan but to extend Russian interests in Manchuria. However, after the Three Power Intervention, "Li's diplomacy in relation to Japan was framed and dominated by the obligations which he had incurred towards Russia."<sup>34</sup> Feeling also that if Japan was to be restrained from further attacks upon Manchuria, Russia must be given a strong foothold and strategic advantages in that territory and having been given assurance from Russia that the territorial integrity of China would be preserved, Li Hung-chang finally agreed to the three main points that Russia desired; (1) that Russia might build the railway across Manchuria from Chita to Vladivostok, but it must be done by a private company; (2) that China would cede to Russia a strip of land sufficient for the construction and operation of the railway; and (3) that the two countries were to come to the defense of each other in case Japan should threaten the territory or the possessions of Russia.<sup>35</sup> Prince Lobanov was entrusted with the responsibility of drawing up the final treaty. This treaty was a secret defensive alliance for a period of fifteen years and was aimed mainly toward Japan. It was signed in May, 1896, and was called the Li-Lobanov Secret Treaty.<sup>36</sup>

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34. Bland, p. 183

35. K.S. Weigh, "Russo-Chinese Diplomacy," p. 61

36. Yakhontoff, p. 365



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34. Ibid., p. 183.

35. E. S. Seligson, "Russo-Chinese Diplomacy," p. 61.  
36. Yakubovitch, p. 208.

Sino-Russian Secret Treaty of 1896\*

Article I. Any aggression directed by Japan against the Russian territory in Eastern Asia, or territory of China or that of Korea shall be considered as necessitating the immediate application of the present treaty.

In such case the two High Contracting Parties engage to support reciprocally each other with all the land and sea forces they may be able to dispose of at that moment (lit. "don't elles pourraient disposer en ce moment et a s'entr'aider autant que possible pour le ravitaillement de leurs forces respectives.")

Article II. As soon as the two High Contracting Parties shall be engaged in a common action, no treaty of peace with the adversary may be concluded by either without the consent of the other.

Article III. During military operations all Chinese ports shall be open, when necessary, to the warships of Russia, which shall find there any assistance of the Chinese authorities they may require.

Article IV. In order to facilitate for the Russian land forces access to the points under menace and to assure the means of existence, the Chinese Government consents to the construction of a railway across the Chinese provinces of Amur and Kirin in the direction of Vladivostok.

The junction of this railway with the railways of Russia shall not serve as a pretext for any encroachment on Chinese territory, nor for an attempt against the sovereign rights of His Majesty the Emperor of China. The construction and exploitation of this railway shall be accorded to the Russo-Chinese Bank and the clauses of the contract which shall be concluded to that effect, shall be duly discussed by the Minister of China at St. Petersburg and by the Russo-Chinese Bank.

Article V. It is understood that in case of war foreseen by the Article I, Russia shall



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Article V. It is understood that in case of war foreseen by the Article I, Russia shall

be free to use the railway mentioned in Article IV for the transportation and provisioning of her troops. In peace time Russia shall have the same right for the transportation and provisioning of her troops, with the right to stop over for no purpose other than those justified by the necessity of transportation.

\*Translated from the French text of the original consulted in the Archives of the Narcomindiel (Foreign Office) at Moscow.

The benefits from this treaty were decidedly in the hands of the Russians. The agreement was really a charter which gave to Russia a free hand in Manchuria for it gave her a power great enough to almost annex Manchuria as part of the Russian Empire. By the end of 1897 there was hardly a town in Manchuria but what had Russian outposts. Li Hung-chang has been accused by some of cowardice and treason because of his conciliatory methods and his seeming favoritism towards Russia in the terms of the agreement, but his decisions were based on his definite appreciation of China's incapacity to resist attack. Bland says, "He was never too proud, but only too wise, to fight."<sup>37</sup>

The treaty of 1896 did not come to light until the Washington Conference, but it lost its meaning during the Boxer uprising because of further Russian aggression. If Russia had observed its provisions the Russo-Japanese War might not have taken place.<sup>38</sup>

#### Chinese Eastern Railway

The Railway across Manchuria developed into a most effective in-

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37. Bland, p. 88

38. Morse and MacNair, p. 415 footnote



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### Chinese Eastern Railway

The Railway across Manchuria developed into a most effective in-

37. Ibid., p. 68

38. James and MacArthur, p. 413 footnote

strument for the expansion of Russian influence in Northern China. Witte desired friendship with China, for he felt that it would be the best policy for Russia, and cooperation with China in Manchurian railway development would be an effective way to bring about that feeling. He made an agreement with the Russo-Chinese Bank for it to cede the concession to construct the railway, from the city of Chita to the Russian South Ussuri Railway, to the Chinese Eastern Railway Company which would be formed for that purpose. This agreement was signed September 8, 1896.

By the terms of this agreement, the Bank was to establish a company with a capital of five million roubles,<sup>39</sup> which was to be called the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, organized under the Russian laws and whose statutes were to be confirmed by the Czar. The President of the Company was to be named by the Chinese government; he was to reside in Peking, but was to be paid by the company. His duties were to see that the Bank and the Railway Company fulfilled their obligations to the Chinese government; he was also responsible for the relations of the Bank and the Railway Company with the Chinese government and with the Central and local authorities. The shareholders must be either Russian or Chinese.<sup>40</sup>

The construction of the railway was to begin twelve months from date of contract and finished within six years. The guage of the line was to be five feet, the width of the Russian railways. The Chinese

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39. H.B.Morse, "International Relations of the Chinese Empire," v. 3, p. 83

40. W.W.Willoughby, "Foreign Rights and Interests in China," p. 422



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40. H.B. Morse, "Foreign Rights and Interests in China," p. 422.

government was to assume responsibility for the protection of the road and of the employees, but all criminal cases were to be settled by local authorities. The Chinese government was to order local authorities to assist the Company in obtaining materials and in making transportation easier. All land necessary for construction work, and any land in the vicinity needed for securing raw material was to be given to the company, free of charge, if they belonged to the state, and if private, upon payment to the owner. These lands belonging to the Company, and all the income of the Company, would be exempt from taxes.<sup>41</sup>

The Company was to have absolute right of the administration of the area belonging to it, could build any buildings necessary and could construct and operate all telegraph lines needed by the company. In the statutes, according to which the Russian government granted a charter to the Company on December 4, 1896, the preservation of law and order on the lands was to be under the control of police agents appointed by the Company. After thirty-six years China could purchase the line and eighty years after completion of the line it would automatically become Chinese property.

An Imperial Ukase of 1901 made provision for the establishment of Russian judicial officials within the area of the Chinese Eastern Railway. They were to have jurisdiction over matters arising between Russian subjects exclusively in criminal and civil matters.<sup>42</sup>

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41. G.H.Blakeslee, "The Pacific Area," p. 200

42. Willoughby, p. 158



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41. O.H. Blakelock, "The Pacific Area," p. 200

42. Willoughby, p. 138

The Chinese Eastern Railway Company was organized during the early part of 1897 and the first work was done on the railroad across Manchuria in August, 1897. By 1904 Russia had the following railways in Manchuria: "West to east, Manchouli-Harbin-Suifenhao, 950 miles; north to south, Harbin-Talienwan-Port Arthur, 646 miles - a total of 1596 miles"....."The main line of the Trans-Siberian Railway was completed in 1904. Approximately 1,000 miles of this line crossed Manchuria."<sup>43</sup> This route across Manchuria was 568 miles shorter than the Amur route.

In obtaining the concession for building the Chinese Eastern Railway, Russia had received an important grant which gave her great control in Manchuria and has in recent years caused many international disputes. The majority of the shares were in the hands of the Russians; as the President was merely a figurehead, the actual control was in the hands of the Russians. Under the clause allowing policing to be done by the agents of the Company, Russian troops were stationed along the line, extensive barracks were built for the Russian army of occupation which was supposed to be protecting the railroad, and police centers were established which later grew up into settlements. Harbin developed from one of these police centers<sup>44</sup> as the population began to depend more and more upon the military forces for protection. The Russian government held the Railway Company in their hands by the provision which gave them the right to examine all the statutes. The

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43. Morse and MacNair, p. 416 footnote

44. R.R.Rosen, "Forty Years of Diplomacy," p. 140



The Chinese Eastern Railway Company was organized during the early part of 1897 and the first work was done on the railroad across Manchuria in August, 1897. By 1902 Russia had the following railways in Manchuria: "East to west, Manchouli-Harbin-Suifu, 930 miles; north to south, Harbin-Tieling-Fort Arthur, 555 miles - a total of 1385 miles." "The main line of the Trans-Siberian Railway was completed in 1904. Approximately 1,000 miles of this line crossed Manchuria." This route across Manchuria was 365 miles shorter than the other route.

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43. Morse and McNeill, p. 418 footnote

44. R.H. Rosen, "Forty Years of Diplomacy," p. 140

property was free from taxes and the company could transport troops over the railroad. All this was disguised annexation of China for Russia was preparing to exercise a political control within the railway zone and knew China could not resist as Russia maintained armed forces along the railway line. It was on the provisions in this agreement of 1896 that Russia, and later Japan, based their political jurisdiction<sup>45</sup> in Manchuria.

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45. Willoughby, p. 423



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22. Geography, p. 432

# The Far East, 1898-1905







#### IV. THE AGGRESSIVE POLICY OF THE MILITARISTIC PARTY OF RUSSIA AND ITS RESULTS, 1898 - 1905

##### Taking of Port Arthur

The period beginning in 1898 started with an aggressive foreign policy led by the war party. This policy of obtaining power in China through concessions was similar to that of other countries at that time, but the Russian leaders carried it so far that eventually it led to disaster in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.

After the Three Power Intervention all three countries, Russia, France and Germany, looked for reward. During the years between 1895-1897 France and Russia had been rewarded in the benefits they had received from the Russo-Chinese Bank and Chinese Eastern Railway. Germany was also anxious to reap some reward for her share in the Intervention. As early as September, 1895, Germany was considering the lease of Kiaochow, which was valuable as a commercial and strategical point. In 1897 she informed Austria, Russia and Italy of her intention to acquire <sup>it as</sup> a naval base in China. This would be an unwelcome move for Russia for she had intended to eventually claim this territory for her own purposes.

Count Witte relates in his Memoirs that the Kaiser of Germany and the Czar of Russia were out driving and the Kaiser asked the Czar if he would object to Germany taking Kiaochow for a base for German shipping. He desired the Czar's consent before he took it. Count Witte had little doubt but that the Czar found it impossible to refuse and the Kaiser





took it as consent.<sup>1</sup>

Germany now waited for the opportune moment to seize the territory. This came on November 1, 1897, when two German missionaries were murdered at the village of Kiachwang. German warships had been off the coast of China during the summer and autumn and were prepared for action. On November 14 a German force expelled the Chinese garrison from Tsingtau, the port at the mouth of Kiaochow Bay, seized the forts and occupied the port. On March 6, 1898 a convention was signed at Peking by which China leased to Germany for ninety-nine years the land on both sides of Kiaochow Bay, including Tsingtau.

After the taking of Kiaochow by the Germans, Count Muraviev, the Russian foreign minister, advocated the taking of Port Arthur as this would be an ice-free port on the coast of her sphere of influence. Witte strongly opposed this move not knowing at the time of the arrangement that had been concluded between the Kaiser and the Czar.

Count Witte had been very influential in framing the treaty of 1896 and in receiving a grant from China to build the Chinese Eastern Railway across Manchuria. He realized the danger of possible future trouble with Japan and also saw failure for his policy of peaceful economic penetration in Manchuria. Such a policy would alter the character of the Chinese Eastern Railway from a peaceful advance for commercial reasons into a political and aggressive policy. Through

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1. Witte, "Memoirs of Count Witte," p. 410



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Witte's work an industrial development had been created which he hoped would raise Russia from an agricultural state to a higher plane of development.<sup>2</sup> He had put into operation a plan of pacific conquest of Manchuria by means of industrial and commercial penetration and the success of his life work depended upon peace with other countries, especially Japan. If Port Arthur were taken by Russia and a naval commander given extensive powers, he felt that his plans would be interfered with and his monopolized sphere of control through the Russo-Chinese bank and the Chinese Eastern Railway would be ended. Count Witte also opposed the taking of Port Arthur because he said it would be treachery to seize territory from a country with whom a defensive alliance had been made. He says in his Memoirs, "I reminded my hearers that we had declared the principle of China's territorial integrity and that on the strength of that principle we forced Japan to withdraw from the Liaotung Peninsula."<sup>3</sup>

In Russia, however, each of the ministers of the state worked independently and received authority for his acts from the Czar personally and at this time Count Witte's influence was less than the influence of other ministers. The Czar was now under the influence of Muraviev who succeeded in making the Czar fear that the British ships that were in the vicinity would take Port Arthur if Russia didn't take it. So the Czar sanctioned the seizure of Port Arthur

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2. R.R. Rosen, "Forty Years of Diplomacy," p. 196

3. Witte, p. 99



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which the Three Power Intervention had recently forced Japan to give up. The Russian squadron was ordered to Port Arthur with the intention of occupying the Port. During December, 1897, the Russian squadron arrived at Port Arthur and occupied it although Russia declared she had no intention of infringing on the suzerainty of China but would withdraw when the danger was over.

In January, 1898, General Alexey Kuropatkin became Minister of War and he demanded the whole of the Kwantung Peninsula. China hesitated but was too weak to resist and being assured by Russia that the occupation was only a protective measure against other powers,<sup>4</sup> she signed on March 27, 1898, the first of two conventions, and on March 29 the Russian flag was raised at Port Arthur. The agreement was made by Li Hung-chang and Chang Yin-hwan, the Russian charge of affairs. According to Count Witte's own statement Russia paid both officials for drawing up the agreement.<sup>5</sup> Li Hung-chang received five hundred thousand roubles and Chang Yin-hwan two hundred fifty thousand roubles.<sup>6</sup>

By this agreement of March 27, 1898, Russia obtained a twenty-five year lease on Port Arthur and Dalny with the adjacent waters and islands, but the lease was not to effect the sovereign rights of China. Within the leased territory Chinese citizens could continue to live but no Chinese troops should be stationed there. A neutral zone of

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4. K.S.Weigh, "Russo-Chinese Diplomacy," p. 79

5. Witte, p. 103

6. Morse and MacNair, "Far Eastern International Relations," p.427



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about sixty miles, which was to be under Chinese jurisdiction, was closed to Chinese troops. Port Arthur was to be an exclusive naval port for the use of Russian and Chinese ships only. Dalny, however, with the exception of the part used entirely for naval purposes, was to be a trading port open to all nations. The agreement provided that the contract of 1896 was to be extended to cover a branch line from Port Arthur and Dalny, to connect these two ports with Harbin on the Chinese Eastern Railway, but the clause in Article VIII closed with the words, "Consent to the construction of the railway on the basis indicated shall never under any form serve as a pretext for the seizure of Chinese territory or for an encroachment on the sovereign rights of China."<sup>7</sup>

On May 7, 1898, Russia made another agreement which defined the boundary of the leased territory. Within this leased territory no ports should be open to trade of other nations and no economic concessions could be made to other nations without Russia's consent.

On July 6, 1898 a new agreement was signed between Russia or the Chinese Eastern Railway, and China, concerning the southern branch of the railway which was to connect the new lease with Russian territory. The name of this branch was to be the Southern Manchurian Branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Permission was granted to the company to cut timber on government lands and to mine coal in the rail-

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7. Manchuria, "Treaties and Agreements," p. 43



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wayarea for the use of the company in building the road. It was also agreed that the company might at its pleasure open a line of sea-going vessels for the purpose of securing and transporting the necessary freight, workmen and other necessities needed during the construction of the railway. Within the leased territory Russia was to fix the customs tariff, while China was to retain the right to levy and collect duties at boundaries on goods moving between the leased area and the interior. China might arrange with Russia for Russia to establish customs at Dalny and to appoint the Chinese Eastern Railway Company to act as agent of the Chinese Imperial Board of Revenue to manage Customs and collect duties for China, but the Customs was to be under the control of Peking government.

Count Witte says in his Memoirs, "The Chinese Eastern Railway was designed exclusively for cultural and peaceful purposes, but jingoist adventurers turned it into a means of political aggression involving the violation of treaties, the breaking of freely given promises and the disregard of the elementary interests of other nationalities."<sup>8</sup> Yet after the agreements were signed, Witte hastened to construct the branch line from Harbin to Port Arthur and Dalny, the leading commercial port of the Far East. The Railway now supplied military equipment, transported troops and the company financed military enterprises. A naval fortress was built at Port Arthur and supply depots were established. The occupation of Port Arthur completed Russia's hold on the

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8. Witte, p. 102



agreed that the company might at its pleasure open a line of sea-going vessels for the purpose of securing and transporting the necessary freight, workmen and other necessities needed during the construction of the railway. Within the leased territory Russia was to fix the customs tariff, while China was to retain the right to levy and collect duties at boundaries on goods moving between the leased area and the interior. China might arrange with Russia for Russia to establish customs at Peking and to appoint the Chinese Eastern Railway Company to act as agent of the Chinese Imperial Board of Revenue to manage Customs and collect duties for China, but the Customs was to be under the control of Peking Government.

General Witte says in his Memoirs, "The Chinese Eastern Railway was designed exclusively for cultural and peaceful purposes, but Japanese adventures turned it into a means of political aggression involving the violation of treaties, the breaking of freely given promises and the disregard of the elementary interests of other nationalities." Yet after the agreements were signed, Witte hastened to construct the branch line from Harbin to Port Arthur and Dairen, the leading commercial port of the Far East. The Railway now supplied military equipment, transported troops and the company financed military enterprises. A naval fortress was built at Port Arthur and supply depots were established. The occupation of Port Arthur completed Russia's hold on the

province of Manchuria. It supplied her with a base and put her in command of the naval approaches to its port.

Russia had now reached a position to dominate Manchuria and North China.

### Open Door Policy

British capitalists whose trade had been cut off by the building of the branch railway line to Port Arthur received a new concession from China for an extension of her railroad in North China, but Russia protested against this expansion of British interests. Russia and Great Britain, however, came to terms by drawing up the Anglo-Russian railway agreement of April 28, 1899.<sup>9</sup>

1. Great Britain engages not to seek for her own account, or on behalf of British subjects or of others, any railway concessions to the North of the Great Wall of China, and not to obstruct, directly or indirectly, applications for railway concessions in that region supported by the Russian Government.

2. Russia, on her part, engages not to seek for her own account, or on behalf of Russian subjects, or of others, any railway concessions in the basin of the Yangtze, and not to obstruct, directly or indirectly, applications for railway concessions in that region supported by the British Government.

Friendship between China and Russia was strengthened by an exchange of notes with Peking, June, 1899. This reasserted the right of China to construct all railways north and northeast of Peking with Chinese capital and under Chinese supervision. Russia, however, was

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9. J.V.A. MacMurray, "Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, 1894-1911," v. 1, p. 204



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to have the first chance, if any outsider was asked for financial aid and no other government was to be allowed to construct railways.

This process of making international agreements over Chinese territory and carving out spheres of influence and economic concessions, led to a declaration of the Open Door Policy by United States. International jealousies began in the middle of the eighties in the growing rivalry and conflicts between nations who had begun to gain footholds in China.

England had obtained Hongkong in 1842, and Northern Burma in 1886. France, in aiming to advance the religious cause in 1883 and 1884, gained control of Annam and Tonking and became a danger to China on the south. In the north Russia had gained in 1881 western parts of Ili and was an increasingly menacing power. In 1881 Japan had acquired the Liuchiu Islands and in 1895 increased her influence in Korea.<sup>10</sup> China's war with Japan in 1894 and 1895 revealed the weakness of China as she had been defeated previously only by Western Powers. This defeat increased the scramble of the European nations for territory before China should fall to pieces. Germany, in 1897, seized Kiaochow and acquired its lease for 99 years. Russia, who had received the right to build the Siberian railway to Vladivostok, seized Port Arthur and received a lease of the port for 25 years. France demanded and received a 99-year lease of Kwangchow. England gained a lease of Kowloon Peninsula, opposite Hongkong and a lease of Weihaiwei, one of China's most important naval and land bases, for as long a period

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10. E.T. Williams, "History of China," pp. 344-352



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as Russia held Port Arthur.<sup>11</sup>

This territorial aggression of the European nations developed into the policy of spheres of interest. Opportunities for investment appeared and capital was attracted by the chance for profits. The leased territories or spheres of interest became regions for exploitation by the European country holding the lease. Using these spheres of interest as bases, the foreign countries reached out and extended their control over inland territory by railway building. A scramble for railway concessions followed. Russia, France, Germany and Great Britain secured rights from China to build railways extending inland from their spheres of interest. United States and Belgium also obtained concessions for railway building. Requests for mining concessions followed the right to build railroads. First option in loans in their individual spheres of interest were demanded by the foreign countries and the control of China began to be a conquest by "bank and railway."

In order to defend and protect their position in the Far East the European nations began to secure from China promises never to cede certain designated areas to any other power. Existence of these spheres of interest depended on their recognition not only by China, but by all other powers, so the next step to make their position more secure was to get recognition of the spheres of influence by rival powers by making international treaties with them. Treaties were concluded between Great Britain and France in 1896, Great Britain and Germany, 1898, Great Britain and Russia in 1899 agreeing on rights,

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11. Morse and MacNair, pp. 425-428



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Spheres of interest did not include any political power. They were supposed to be simply concessions where a dominant power had priority rights in economic development. The principle of the open door recognized the vested rights and special interests as long as a certain amount of opportunity for others was preserved. However, China regarded them as an attack on the independence of China. The Powers soon began to demand exclusive rights and they gained complete control of industries and communication. This violated the principle of equal opportunity of trade. The Powers also began to gain political power by building up rival economic areas which threatened the integrity and independence of China. If China was to be prevented from a final break-up and division between the Powers, it was time for some one to take a definite stand and get all nations to agree to observe a definite policy on which to base their expansion in China.

England was the first to become alarmed at the situation. During the battle for concessions many of the British leaders had argued for the open door and advocated methods by which the policy would be secure. England was more interested in the open door because she had interests in every Chinese port and did not wish to see any port closed to her trade. England strongly advocated the policy as long as she was the predominant power, but with the growing Russian advance in the north, she soon drifted into a passive policy and did not try to enforce the policy although she still held the desire to keep China intact. After



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her sphere of interest was established in the Yangtze Valley she could not consistently preach an open door, so it was left to United States to formulate and advance a definite policy.

During the last part of the year 1899, Secretary Hay sent out notes to London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Tokyo, Rome and Paris. He hoped to get all countries that had spheres of interest to support the declaration that each one in its own sphere:<sup>12</sup>

First -- Will in no wise interfere with any treaty port or any vested interest within any so-called "sphere of interest" or leased territory it may have in China.

Second -- That the Chinese treaty tariff of the time being shall apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all such ports as are within said "sphere of interest" (unless they be "free ports"), no matter to what nationality it may belong, and that duties so leviable shall be collected by the Chinese government.

Third -- They will levy no higher harbor dues on vessels of another nationality frequenting any port in such "sphere" than shall be levied on vessels of its own nationality, and no higher railroad charges over lines built, controlled, or operated within its "sphere" on merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects of other nationalities transported through such "sphere" than shall be levied on similar merchandise belonging to its own nationality transported over equal distances.

All the Powers answered favorably saying that they would agree to the policy on the condition that other countries would do the same. Russia claimed that she had already demonstrated the policy of the

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12. Manchurian treaties, p. 56



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Third -- They will levy no higher harbor dues on vessels of another nationality transiting any port in such "sphere" than shall be levied on vessels of its own nationality, and no higher railway charges over lines built, controlled, or operated within its "sphere" on merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects of other nationalities trans-ported through such "sphere" than shall be levied on similar merchandise belonging to its own nationality transported over equal distances.

All the Powers answered favorably saying that they would agree to the policy on the condition that other countries would do the same. Russia claimed that she had already demonstrated the policy of the

open door by creating Dalny a free port. She said she had no intention of claiming any special privileges. On March 20, 1900, Secretary Hay sent a notice to all the countries stating that similar action had been taken by all the various powers who had spheres of interest in China and on July 30, 1900, the principle of the Open Door Doctrine was declared.

### The Boxer Uprising

The foreign aggression in China, however, had been causing a strong anti-foreign feeling in that country. The policy of the Chinese government at this time of increasing local military bands caused this anti-foreign group in China, as well as the foreigners, to feel that the government was preparing for war. The Powers began to increase their forces and this in turn aroused the natives to the point of open trouble.<sup>13</sup>

This Boxer uprising, as it was called, gave Russia, who took advantage of the situation, a chance to increase her forces in Manchuria. During the early part of the uprising Russia continued her policy of aggressive but peaceful control on a large scale. Count Muraviev maintained an optimistic attitude about the whole trouble even after the railway communication between Peking and Tientsin had been cut off and the Boxers had entered Peking.<sup>14</sup> The taking of the Taku forts by the allies, caused the Anti-foreign feeling to flame up all over China

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13. Morse and MacNair, p.455

14. K. Asakawa, "Russo-Japanese Conflict," p. 141



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13. Morse and McMillan, p. 425

14. E. H. Harkness, " Russo-Japanese Conflict," p. 141

and the uprisings spread to Manchuria. Count Lamsdorff, who had succeeded Muraviev after his death, sent troops to deal with the trouble and to protect the railroad, for property and supplies were being destroyed. The methods used by the Russian troops were brutal but effective and the resistance in Manchuria was overcome. Aigun was captured July 30, Harbin on August 3, and on August 4, Newchwang was seized.<sup>15</sup>

Russia occupied the territory as if it were conquered territory. "Our army," says Witte, "behaved in Manchuria as in a conquered country, thus preparing the ground for a catastrophe."<sup>16</sup> The aggressive leaders hoisted the Russian flag at Newchwang and on August 14, General Groderkoff wrote to the Minister of War that it was fifty years previous that Nevelskoy had raised the Russian flag at the mouth of the Amur River and had succeeded in taking the left bank of the Amur and now the right bank was taken and the Amur River had become an internal waterway.<sup>17</sup>

Alexander Ular<sup>18</sup> in an article on, "Russia, Manchuria, and Mongolia," claims there never were any Boxers in Manchuria but that the riots were caused by robbers of Chinese origin who had been instigated by Russian agents to cross the Amur and to attack the Russian peasants. Russia did not destroy these Hunhuse robbers but simply drove them

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15. Asakawa, p. 142

16. Witte, p. 110

17. Asakawa, p. 145

18. Contemporary Review, v. 84. Aug. 1903, p. 189



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15. Lasker, p. 142  
16. Witte, p. 110  
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18. Contemporary Review, v. 34, Aug. 1903, p. 122

back to the borders of the Mongolian desert. They reserved them for future occasions when they would be needed for occasional raids to prove that Russian evacuation of Manchuria was impossible if peace was to be secured.

Although Russia gave assurance that foreign and Chinese rights and privileges would not be interfered with, on October 4, the Russian customs flag was substituted over the customhouse for the Russian naval flag. The major part of Manchuria was under the military power of Russia and this act meant the expansion of their economic control. To defend herself, Russia said her policy was one of friendly assistance in suppressing the insurrection and restoring order. This situation was embarrassing to the international relations of Russia. Witte had always advocated the policy of peaceful penetration and he was now being opposed by Minister of War, Kuropatkin and Commander-in-Chief of naval and land forces in the Peninsula, Admiral Alexeiev. They favored complete control of the territory they had brought under Russian military authority. Their problem was, how could the Empire convert the prize from a temporary conquest into a permanent possession. This attitude caused Count Witte to make the statement,<sup>19</sup> "Count Lamsdorff and myself are more afraid of Kuropatkin than of the Chinese."

Again posing as a friend of China, Russia aimed to secure recognition of her power in Manchuria from the Chinese Empire, by leading in the withdrawal of the diplomatic legations and troops from Peking to

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19. Witte, p. 114



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Tientsin. She also favored referring the amount of indemnity to the Hague Tribunal. Russia desired strongly to be China's best friend, for if China became helpless, the Russian position would be weak, but by aiding China, she would strengthen her own position.<sup>20</sup> Therefore on August 28, Russia sent a circular note to the Powers, saying she had no designs on Chinese territory but had occupied Newchwang to repel the rebels and, that with the other Powers they had aimed to protect the legations and to help the Chinese government to overcome her troubles. Russia promised to withdraw forces from Manchuria when order was restored if Powers presented no obstacle. The note also stated that as long as the Chinese government had left Peking, the purpose of the troops there had been accomplished and so the Russian government was directing the withdrawal of her Legation and the troops from Peking.

The Russian Legation left Peking September 29. France, Russia's ally, finally followed her example. However, as the legations of no other country left, the Russian Legation returned on October 21.<sup>21</sup>

The Powers wondered what was behind the Russian intention of withdrawal. They felt there was some agreement between Russia and Li Hung-chang. Russia had assured the world that her occupation was temporary, but had given no sign of withdrawing her troops. During 1900 Russia had pushed her railway construction, her military and naval preparations, both in the leased territory and in all of the Russian far eastern

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20. Weigh, p. 100

21. H.B. Morse, "International Relations of the Chinese Empire," v.3, p. 306



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provinces. This made the ambitious nature of Russia's aims clearly evident. She continued military operations and had a large police force in Chinese Eastern Railway Zone. She was carrying on a vigorous program of aggressive expansion and was bringing all Manchuria under Russian control. Kuropatkin had said, when Witte told him that the Boxer insurrection was partly the result of the seizure of Port Arthur, "On my part, I am very glad. This will give us an excuse for seizing Manchuria."<sup>22</sup>

To retard the aggression of Russia, England and Germany signed an agreement on October 16, 1900. In this agreement the Open Door Policy was restated. The two powers declared they would not "make use of the present complication to obtain for themselves any territorial advantages in Chinese dominions and will direct their policy toward maintaining undiminished the territorial condition of the Chinese Empire."<sup>23</sup> The agreement also stated that if any other power tried to gain territorial advantages they would consult together to protect their interests.

Russia meanwhile continued to occupy territory around Tientsin where her troops outnumbered those of any other nation. Russia issued a note on November 6 stating that she had established herself there "by act of war and right of conquest." The land she declared to be under her control only and although the Powers objected, Russia

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22. Witte, p. 107

23. G.N. Steiger, "China and the Occident," p. 488



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retained it as a concession.

It was becoming more and more evident that Russia was not going to withdraw troops but was putting strong pressure on China to obtain further rights in the Eastern Provinces. However, by this time, the interest of the Powers in China was so great that no power could absorb a rich section of Chinese territory without a protest from those interested in the integrity of China and the Open Door Policy. Great Britain, United States and Japan doubted the value of Russia's assurance as to evacuation and to the rights of subjects of other countries.

On November 11, 1900, a Russo-Chinese agreement was signed at Port Arthur. Russia made China promise, that if any lines were built under foreign auspices in northerly or northeasterly direction from Peking, Russia's assistance would be first asked for. China was to offer no resistance to building of a railway from Harbin to Port Arthur. China was to furnish supplies to Russian guards, to disband troops and surrender all munitions. The forts in South Manchuria, not occupied by Russia, were to be dismantled.<sup>24</sup>

In December, 1901 the American government was informed of a new agreement that was to be signed by China which would increase Russia's military control and decrease China's control in Manchuria. The agreement provided that troops of other nations should not be allowed to protect railways and no more railway construction was to be allowed in Manchuria

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24. Morse, v. 3, p. 344



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except with consent of Russia.<sup>25</sup> Although Count Lamsdorff denied that this agreement existed, reports persisted and they excited suspicion among the Powers. China, who had been at first impressed favorably with the evacuation agreement of Russia, now became suspicious and fearful. The Powers, also warned China of danger. China, therefore, refused to sanction the agreement of 1901 and Count Lamsdorff was obliged to declare that no intention existed to depart from the assurance to restore Manchuria to China, as soon as a central government was established at Peking strong enough to guarantee Russia against disturbances.

#### Anglo-Japanese Alliance

By the beginning of 1902 the Powers were thoroughly aroused by the fact that the Russian military forces held the whole of Manchuria.<sup>26</sup> Great Britain, from both principle and interest, had been advocating a policy of the open door in China which was being undermined by Russian aggression and Japan looked with apprehension upon Russian expansion in Manchuria.

Great Britain was especially fearful of Russian expansion toward India and of the danger the Russian power was creating for her commercial interests in China. Therefore, feeling that these interests would be safer if an alliance was formed with a strong power of the Far East, she took the initiative in suggesting an alliance with Japan. This alliance, she hoped, might help to maintain the integrity of

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25. W.W.Willoughby, "Foreign Rights and Interests in China," p.159

26. Morse, v. 3, p. 417



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#### Anglo-Japanese Alliance

By the beginning of 1902 the Powers were thoroughly aroused by the fact that the Russian military forces held the whole of Manchuria.<sup>26</sup> Great Britain, from both principle and interest, had been advocating a policy of the open door in China which was being undermined by Russian aggression and Japan looked with apprehension upon Russian expansion in Manchuria.

Great Britain was especially fearful of Russian expansion toward India and of the danger the Russian power was creating for her commercial interests in China. Therefore, feeling that these interests would be safer if an alliance was formed with a strong power of the Far East, she took the initiative in suggesting an alliance with Japan. This alliance, she hoped, might help to maintain the integrity of

25. W.W. Willoughby, "Foreign Rights and Interests in China," p. 159

26. Moore, v. 3, p. 417

China. Suggestions were made by Great Britain to Japan in April 1901 and later in July of the same year.<sup>27</sup>

However, for Japan the Manchurian question was even more serious. Japan had made attempts since 1898 to come to some definite terms with Russia for she was fearful of Russian aggression penetrating down into Korea and menacing her interests there. If Russia gained political control of Manchuria, the independence of Korea and the safety of Japan would be threatened and a closed door in Manchuria would ruin the economic activity of Japan. Japan also felt that only a strong alliance could curb this growing danger and prevent the complete control of Manchuria by Russia.

The two countries, therefore, who were anxious to keep peace and maintain the status quo in the Far East were drawn together due to their common danger and they formed an agreement which was signed on January 30, 1902. It was called the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

This political combination was a danger to Russian interests. It was a step which Russia should have used all her power to prevent.<sup>28</sup> If she had been willing to come to some agreement with Japan after 1898, she might have prevented this Alliance or Russia might have faced the Alliance, if she could have defended her position in Manchuria with all the forces of the State or had been willing to give up her aggressive policy in Korea<sup>29</sup> but these things she could not or would not do. The

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27. Asakawa, p. 200

28. Rosen, p. 189

29. Ibid, p. 190



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failure of Russia to come to some agreement with Japan and her short-sighted policy of not living up to her promises of withdrawal from Manchuria<sup>30</sup> had fatal consequences and caused the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902.

The agreement was for a term of five years and both parties recognized the independence of China and Korea and the special interests of both Japan and Great Britain in those areas. Article I provided that either power might take any measures necessary to protect their interests in China and Korea. Article II said that if, in taking such action, either power was attacked, the other contracting party would remain neutral and try to prevent other powers from joining against its ally. However, "if any other power should join in hostilities against that ally, the other power will come to its assistance, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it."<sup>31</sup>

This treaty was distinctly a defensive treaty for it had no aggressive tendencies. Lord Lansdowne considered the agreement a measure of precaution and hoped it would help to keep peace or at least to restrict the area of trouble if peace was not possible.<sup>32</sup>

Russia read between the lines and realized that it was aimed at her but outwardly she took the agreement calmly. In answer to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance she drew up the Russo-French agreement and on March

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30. See p. 46 and 57

31. Morse, v. 3, p. 417

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16, the following statement was issued. Russia and France, "being obliged to take into consideration the case in which either the aggressive action of third Powers, or the recurrence of disturbances in China," . . . . . "might become a menace to their own interests, the two allied Governments reserve to themselves the right to consult in that contingency as to the means to be adopted for securing those interests."<sup>33</sup>

Besides causing this defensive agreement with France, the Anglo-Japanese alliance influenced Russia to conclude the Russo-Chinese Convention.

#### Russo-Chinese Convention, 1902

By this Convention, signed on April 8, 1902, Russia agreed to the re-establishment of Chinese authority in Manchuria and again agreed to evacuate Manchuria. This evacuation was to take place in three periods of six months each. During the first six months the troops were to be withdrawn from the territory in the southwestern part of the province of Mukden and west of the Liao River. They were to be withdrawn during the second six months from the rest of the Province of Mukden and from the Province of Kirin, and the evacuation of Hei-lung-chiang and the rest of Manchuria was to be completed during the last six months. This evacuation was to be completed provided no disturbance arose and that there was no action by the other powers which might interfere.

China on her part confirmed the obligation to protect the railway and all persons in its employ and bound herself to secure the safety of all Russian subjects. Any extension of the South Manchurian rail-

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33. MacMurray, p. 325



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China on her part confirmed the obligation to protect the railway

and all persons in its employ and bound herself to secure the safety of all Russian subjects. Any extension of the South Manchurian rail-

way or the building of any branches was to be considered a question of mutual discussion between Russia and China.

Russia's conduct after the treaty showed how broad her interpretation of it was. The treaty to evacuate Manchuria depended upon no action of the powers interfering, but almost any attitude of the powers could be used as an excuse not to withdraw troops. Evacuation also depended upon no new disturbance arising in the territory. Russia could easily allow the Hunhuse robbers to raid the territory from the Mongolian border and therefore claim that disturbances were too frequent to warrant the withdrawal of her troops from commercial roads and railroad lines.<sup>34</sup> Article II bound China to secure the safety of all Russian subjects. This security Russia knew was practically impossible as long as the Russian soldiers were in Manchuria and border line raids continued. Article III said that Russia should be notified of the increases in the number of Chinese troops in Manchuria after the Russian evacuation. By this means Russia could see to it that no large Chinese force was being stationed in the country.

Although the treaty was unsatisfactory, Great Britain and Japan did not protest but waited to see if the evacuation would take place. By October 1, the first stage of evacuation was complete although it was more of a transfer of troops from settled towns of Manchuria to become police of the railway zone where a police force was still allowed.

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so that Russian influence in the Far East could be secured by peaceful means but General Bezobrazoff's influence was strong. He had been sent by the Emperor in November 1902 to study the natural resources of Manchuria and he advocated a policy of industrial aggression backed by strong military force.

Before the second period of evacuation took place, Russian policy changed and the withdrawal of the troops began to cease. Yingkow, the treaty port of Newchwang was to be evacuated by April 8, 1903. The Russian power was strong there, the native customs was in Russia's hands and the foreign customs were required to work with Russian authorities. The duties paid by the customs were paid not to the Chinese bank but to the Russo-Chinese Bank which was controlled by Russia. Yinghow was not evacuated at the date due and other nations became concerned. Russia gave reasons such as, the presence of foreign ships of war in port, and uncompleted arrangements for quarantine regulations, but the real reason was that Russia, due to past success in imperialistic ventures, meant to be master in Manchuria as Japan was in Korea.<sup>35</sup>

There was no sign of more withdrawals and a few days later Russia presented to China seven articles, the acceptance of which would be necessary before further evacuation took place.

The seven points drawn up by Russia were:<sup>36</sup>

1. No new treaty ports or foreign consuls to be allowed in Manchuria.

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35. Steiger, p. 510 and Morse, v. 3, p. 419

36. Morse, v. 3, p. 421





2. No foreigners except Russia to be employed in public service in North China.
3. The statutes of administration of Mongolia was not to be changed.
4. Receipts of the Newchwang customs were to be continued to be deposited in Russo-Chinese Bank.
5. The sanitary commission at Newchwang was to be dominated by Russians.
6. Russia to retain control of Port Arthur-Yinghow-Mukden telegraph line.
7. No territory in Manchuria to be alienated to any power.

United States, Great Britain and Japan all protested and warned China against signing. Both Russia and China at first denied that the agreement existed but later China presented the demands. Count Lamsdorff still denied that the demands had been made. He gave the United States assurance that Russia would faithfully adhere to its pledges in Manchuria to respect the rights of other powers. He claimed that delay of evacuation was due to the natural necessity of obtaining assurances from China that she was fulfilling her part of the agreement.

At this time both United States and Japan were asking for the opening of more ports in Manchuria and for the privilege of stationing consuls there. It was in connection with this request that Count Cassini, the Russian Ambassador to the United States, made statements in Washington intimating that some negotiations were going on between Russia and China. It was the day after Count Lamsdorff had denied the



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of the opening of new treaty ports in Manchuria it is impossible for me to speak at present, but it is the earnest conviction of those best acquainted with the state of affairs there, that such a move will not be to the best interest of the territory. Were the question solely a commercial one, it would be different. But open a treaty port in Manchuria, and close upon the heels of commerce will follow political complications of all kinds, which will increase the threats to peace.

China was ready to open the ports to United States but said that difficulties presented by the Russian occupation of Manchuria prevented. Finally, Secretary Hay succeeded in getting China to sign a treaty to be effective six months after the evacuation of Manchuria by Russia. The treaty with United States was signed on October 8, 1903. This commercial agreement provided for the opening of two more Manchurian towns, Antung and Mukden. It provided for international residence and trade in the treaty ports but the rules to govern the trade and residence of foreigners was to be settled between the two countries.

The American-Chinese treaty was the second big blow to Russia.<sup>38</sup> She opposed the treaty and although she had started her evacuation of Manchuria she now reoccupied Mukden. It was very evident that Russia intended to control Manchuria and aimed to close the door of Manchuria to all other nations.

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37. Asakawa, p. 250 and Weigh, p. 110

38. Pasvolsky, p. 33

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37. Asakawa, p. 250 and Weigh, p. 119

38. Pasvolinsky, p. 25 (The first set-back to Russian policy was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance)

### Russo-Japanese War

The Russian failure to live up to her promise of evacuation and her demand, that China close Manchuria to economic enterprise of all nations except Russia, led to a serious contest between Japan and Russia. Count Witte in his Memoirs states, "Our agreement with Japan, dated April 13, 1898, sanctioned the dominating position of that country in Korea. If we had faithfully adhered to the spirit of this agreement there is no doubt but that more or less permanent peaceful relations would have been established between Japan and Russia." ..... "We would have quietly kept the Kwantung Peninsula while Japan would have completely dominated Korea."<sup>39</sup>

Russian official opinion at this time was divided between the war party and the peace party. The peace party, led by Count Lamsdorff and Count Witte, held to the latter's policy of peaceful economic penetration. It favored an agreement with Japan, as the leaders realized the dangers that would be involved in a war with Russia, and they used their influence in every way possible to get Russia to come to some agreement over Korea and Manchuria.

The war party, led by General Kuropatkin, was a keen rival of the peace party. This party was determined to carry out an aggressive policy and to continue to construct railways in Manchuria. The war party was gaining great influence with the Czar who in July, 1903, com-

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bined the territories of Amur and Kwantung into a viceroyalty.<sup>40</sup> He appointed Admiral Alexeiev, who was governor of the Kwantung province, as viceroy of this territory. Admiral Alexeiev advocated a strong aggressive policy and was made responsible only to the Czar. He had command of the naval forces and the troops in the country and had charge of diplomatic relations of these regions with neighboring territories. The war party won out in control over the Czar. Count Witte was dismissed from the Ministry of Finance and affairs in the East were placed under the control of Admiral Alexeiev and Bezobrazoff.

Japan realized the danger this meant to her interests in Korea and Baron Komura sent a telegram to the Japanese minister at St. Petersburg giving him the viewpoint of the home government and asked the minister to negotiate with Count Lamsdorff on the Korean question. Japan greatly desired a lasting peace in the Far East and wanted to eliminate the irritating circumstances so that the natural resources of the East could be developed. She appealed to Russia and requested that she uphold the Open Door Policy and the territorial integrity of China. This opened the way for a peaceful agreement.

Russia postponed and evaded all negotiations. All answers that she sent were very unsatisfactory and implied that the Manchurian question was a problem between Russia and China and should be settled between them and not by any intervention of a third party.

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40. H. Parlett, "A Brief Diplomatic Account of Events in Manchuria," p. 14



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dering on the Yalu River. The Russians had in 1896 signed an agreement with the King of Korea. This had given Russia a lease of over 200 acres. A Russian company had been granted judiciary rights over residents within this leased area. Extensive work had been carried on by Russia in the Tûmen valley. They had built up a harbor town, Yongampo, built railroads and forts, and had forced Koreans into unpaid service.<sup>41</sup> In April 1903 the Russians informed the Korean government that they would continue operations in the Yalu River valley. This meant they would expand over a large part of Korea. Korea asked for Russian evacuation but Russia did not leave, in fact, more Russian troops were moving down into Manchuria.

The independence of Korea had been recognized as a result of the Sino-Japanese War and Japanese interests had been recognized by England in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Now Russian encroachments were threatening the existence of these rights in Korea for Russia was even making attempts to control the taxation and customs of Korea.

The evacuation of Manchuria was also being delayed by Russia and in September 1903 she made new demands on China. She asked that<sup>42</sup>

- (1) China should not cede any ports in Manchuria to any power but Russia;
- (2) Russia should be allowed to construct wharves on the Sungari River and allowed to connect them by telegraph lines;
- (3) Russia be given the right to station troops to protect the lines and ships;
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41. Asakawa, p. 319

42. Ibid, p. 316



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greater duties be imposed on goods brought into Manchuria by rail than those on goods by river or road; (5) After withdrawal of Russian troops, the branches of Russo-Chinese Bank be protected by Chinese troops at the cost of the Bank.

The Powers again urged and warned China not to accept and China finally refused all the demands. United States and Great Britain were especially interested as this was the time that they were trying to get China to open up more ports.<sup>43</sup>

The fall of Witte and the creation of the new Viceroyalty in the Amur and the Kwantung provinces, meant the triumph of an aggressive policy in the Far East and changed the Japanese policy of watchful reserve. The activities on the part of Russia as well as the failure to evacuate Manchuria raised grave doubts in the minds of the Japanese as to the limits of Russian ambitions. Japan therefore tried again to get Russia to come to some agreement. She demanded the complete evacuation of Manchuria and the recognition of Japan's position in Korea. Russia would not accept this and so later Japan proposed that a line be drawn across northern Korea that would divide the spheres of influence of Japan and Russia, the territory north of the line to be in Russian sphere and south, to be in Japanese sphere. Russian diplomacy of delay was again used and Japan, becoming tired of Russian tactics, finally broke off diplomatic relations on February 6, 1904.

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43. See p. 67

44. L.T.Lawton, "The Empires of the East," v. 1, p. 227



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44. L. T. Lawton, "The Spheres of the East," v. I, p. 327

war due to Russian expansion, because of the following reasons: (1) Russia had prevented Japan from holding Port Arthur; (2) between 1895-1905 the Siberian railway was extended to the Manchurian border; (3) the Chinese Eastern railway had been built across Manchuria in which Russian towns had risen and Russian emigrants had settled; (4) the mineral resources and commercial advantages in one of the richest territories of China had been absorbed by Russia; (5) Vladivostok and Port Arthur had been converted into fortresses; (6) Russian warships were making an imposing fleet in the Pacific and Russian success in Korea would mean the extension of Russian influence within a few miles of Japan.

Although Russia claimed her rights and concessions had been legally granted by China, she had actually gained these during periods of weakness in China and had paid bribes in many cases for the concessions received. Russia had plenty of natural resources in Siberia to develop but her big obstacle had been the lack of an ice-free port and she had felt that the taking of Port Arthur was essential to her progress in the East. Now that aggressive policy brought about a most disastrous war for Russia in the East.

The treaty of Portsmouth, signed September 5, 1905, was a big blow to Russian expansion in the East. By this treaty Russia transferred to Japan, with the consent of China, the lease of Port Arthur, Dalny, the adjacent territory and waters, and all rights, privileges and concessions connected with the lease. Russia also transferred to Japan all public works and properties in the leased territory. The southern



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part of the Chinese Eastern Railway from Changchun to Port Arthur and all its branches were ceded to Japan.<sup>45</sup>

Japan and Russia mutually agreed to evacuate Manchuria with the exception of the Liaotung Peninsula and restore the administration to China. Russia recognized Japanese political, military, and economic interests in Korea and agreed not to interfere with any measures Japan might take in that territory. Both countries agreed not to obstruct any measures taken by China to develop commerce or industry in Manchuria, and neither country was to exploit their railways in Manchuria for anything except commercial and industrial purposes.

On December 22, 1905 the Chinese government consented to all transfers and assignments that had been made by Russia to Japan. Russia now retained only the Chinese Eastern Railway as a joint commercial enterprise with China and the northern section of the branch that extended south from Harbin. They controlled as far south as Changchun. The total mileage of railway left under Russian control was about 1080 miles.<sup>46</sup>

Russia had been diligently and consistently extending her borders and had been most industrious in building the Empire, but in 1905 she was unprepared for war. She lacked military skill, supplies were insufficient and too far away. Harbin was a center of gaiety and dissipation. The army officers in Manchuria had been living a life of luxury and indulgence, the authorities were lax in their discipline,

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45. V.H.Yakhontoff, "Russia and the Soviet Union," p. 372

46. Willoughby, p. 426



part of the Chinese Eastern Railway from Changhai to Port Arthur and all its branches were ceded to Japan.

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Japan and Russia mutually agreed to evacuate Manchuria with the exception of the Heilong Peninsula and restore the administration to China. Russia recognized Japanese political, military, and economic interests in Korea and agreed not to interfere with any measures Japan might take in that territory. Both countries agreed not to obstruct any measures taken by China to develop commerce or industry in Manchuria, and neither country was to exploit their railways in Manchuria for anything except commercial and industrial purposes.

On September 23, 1905 the Chinese Government consented to all trans-

fers and assignments that had been made by Russia to Japan. Russia now retained only the Chinese Eastern Railway as a joint commercial enterprise with China and the northern section of the branch that extended south from Harbin. They controlled as far south as Changhai. The total mileage of railway left under Russian control was about 1000 miles.

46

Russia had been diligently and consistently extending her borders and had been most industrious in building the Empire, but in 1905 she was unprepared for war. She lacked military skill, supplies were insufficient and too far away. Harbin was a center of safety and disintegration. The army officers in Manchuria had been living a life of luxury and indolence, the activities were lax in their discipline.

45. V.M. Yekimovitch, "Russia and the Soviet Union," p. 372

46. Wilcocks, p. 422

and a large per cent of the men in the army had not had long connection with the army.<sup>47</sup> The army was lacking in strong, energetic soldiers.

Although this war proved the value of the Trans-Siberian railway, it also proved that it was impossible to depend on a single line railway for transportation of troops and for the maintenance of an army so far away from the base of supplies. If the railway had been double-tracked, Japan might have met with severe defeat.

However, the war of 1904-1905 ended Russian intense and thoughtless imperialism in the Far East and put an effective check on Russian advance in Manchuria. "With the fall of Port Arthur and Mukden, she had reached the crossing of the most perilous ways in her whole history."<sup>48</sup>

After the war, Russia did not give up her policy of penetration in the Far East. She had during a period of 200 years penetrated Asia and created an empire, that stretched from Russia in Europe to the Pacific, and she still had faith in her Far Eastern aims. After the defeat, Russia started to re-study her position in the East and to conduct surveys in the province of Amur and the Baikalia region in order to continue the Russian policy by means of the building of the Amur railway.

Obstacles to Russia were hindrances, but they did not mean defeat; they delayed but did not stop the completion of the policy. Lawton says,<sup>49</sup> "While she has experienced severe reverses from time to time,

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47. Lawton, p. 276

48. B. Burleigh, "The Empire of the East," p. 438

49. Lawton, p. 431



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<sup>48</sup> H. B. Swarthright, "The Empire of the East," p. 438

<sup>49</sup> Lawton, p. 431

never has she been thrown back on her original position. Even her defeats have ended in gain and after each of these, she has waited her opportunity and prepared her way for yet another step forward. Her advance is slow, but it is sure as fate."

China had the Chinese Eastern Railway the right line of defense, the Hai River the source, and the Great Wall the shield.<sup>1</sup> Vladivostok was developed into a fortress and a naval station and plans were made to double-track the Trans-Siberian Railway.

The loss of the railway outlet at Port Arthur made Russia feel the need of an all Russian line to Vladivostok. On April 14, 1903 the Great Railway Bill passed the Duma. The bill provided for 1300 miles of railway across unexplored, warlike territory of extreme temperatures. The route had been partly planned before 1896 but since the charter route across Manchuria had been obtained. This great railway would link up with the Great railway at Harbin and would complete the all-Russian railway from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok.

Russia felt that the building of this line was necessary for two reasons; (1) because of the tariff issue that had been imposed by the Portsmouth Treaty, which allowed the Manchurian railways to be used only for commercial and industrial purposes; and (2) because of the

1. H. J. Han, "Foreign Relations of China," p. 163

2. 1914, p. 100



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## V. RUSSIAN POLICY OF CONCILIATION AND DEFENSE, 1905-1917

### The Amur Railway

After the Russo-Japanese War the Russian policy, "underwent a change from an offensive and aggressive policy to a conciliatory and defensive procedure."<sup>1</sup> Russia made the Chinese Eastern Railway the first line of defense, the Amur River the second, and the Amur Railway the third.<sup>2</sup> Vladivostok was developed into a fortress and a naval station and plans were made to double-track the Trans-Siberian Railway.

The loss of the railway outlet at Port Arthur made Russia feel the need of an all Russian line to Vladivostok. On April 14, 1908 the Amur Railway bill passed the Duma. The bill provided for 1300 miles of railway across unexplored, marshy territory of extreme temperatures. The route had been partly planned before 1896 but then the shorter route across Manchuria had been obtained. This Amur railway would link up with the Ussuri railway at Kharborovsk and would complete the all-Russian railway from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok.

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1. M.J.Bau, "Foreign Relations of China," p. 103

2. Ibid, p. 103



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1. W.A. Dean, "Foreign Relations of China," p. 103

2. Ibid., p. 103

option that China had to purchase the Chinese Eastern Railway at the end of thirty-six years. If Russia was to have an Empire it must protect and secure all its territory and without this railway the Maritime Province might be isolated and Eastern Siberia left undefended. The Ussuri railway would not be of any strategical value without some connecting link under Russian control. The reporter of the Committee of National Defense said in an address to the Duma, "We came to the unanimous decision that this line must be built without delay and that we must complete it by or in 1912. We must also lay down the second track within the same time."<sup>3</sup>

Russia realized that after the Russo-Japanese War the political situation in the East had changed and that the Maritime Province was of more strategic value and importance since the loss of the Kwantung Peninsula. Vladivostok was now Russia's only outlet that provided any chance for commercial possibilities and the Ussuri district was recognized as a very fertile territory and it contained mineral resources as well as navigable waterways.

The railway was of an aggressive nature, for it provided a way to concentrate large armies in the East and might arouse suspicions in neighboring countries, yet, "It is," says Lawton, "a broad and accepted principle of modern statecraft that no civilized and progressive country should leave undeveloped and out of reach a vast expanse of its territories."<sup>4</sup>

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3. L.J.Lawton, "The Empires of the Far East," v.1, p. 439

4. Ibid, p. 444



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3. L. S. Lawson, "The Empire of the Far East", v. 1, p. 439

4. Ibid., p. 444

### Convention of 1907 Between Japan and Russia

Japan had now become the dominating factor in Manchuria. Russia, to defend her interests there, adopted a policy of conciliation with her recent rival. During the years following the Russo-Japanese War, Japan and Russia made several treaties which changed Japan's enemy into a valuable partner.

During June and July 1907, Japan and Russia drew up conventions over the railway situation in Manchuria. The provisions of these conventions aimed to provide a mutual agreement of the two governments for the cooperation of the South Manchurian Railway Company and the Chinese Eastern Railway Company. Agreements were made concerning junctions, the transfer of goods, time schedules for connections, passenger and freight charges and general management of the railways.

The two countries also drew up a political convention which was signed July 30, 1907. They said in the treaty that this was to "consolidate the relations of peace and good neighborhood which have been happily re-established between Japan and Russia," and they wished, "to remove for the future every cause of misunderstanding in the relations of the two Empires."<sup>5</sup>

In Article I each country agreed to respect the territory and the rights that each had received through treaties with China. The Open Door Policy was upheld in Article II.<sup>6</sup>

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5. Manchuria, "Treaties and Agreements," p. 117

6. Ibid, p. 117



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6. Manchuria, "Treaties and Agreements," p. 117

8. Ibid., p. 117

Article II. The two High Contracting Parties recognize the independence and the territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the principle of equal opportunity in whatever concerns the commerce and industry of all nations in that Empire, and undertake to sustain and defend the maintenance of the status quo and respect for this principle by all the pacific means within their reach.

A secret agreement was made at the same time in order to avoid all causes of friction and misunderstanding in connection with questions relating to Manchuria, Mongolia and Korea. Japan's interests in Korea were recognized by Russia in this agreement and Japan recognized Russian interests in Outer Mongolia. Both countries were to refrain from interfering with the other in its developments in their respective spheres. In Manchuria they took the eastward course of the Nonni River as a dividing line for their interests. Japan agreed not to seek railway or telegraph concessions north of the line, and Russia would refrain from any concessions south of the line.<sup>7</sup>

#### Treaties Over Political Rights in the Railway Zone

In May, 1907 a convention was drawn up between China and Russia that reaffirmed the Russian rights very strongly. The Powers objected, for they claimed that the Chinese Eastern Railway was becoming more than a commercial enterprise. It was too much of a government agency having political jurisdiction. Russia also was having a dispute with China over the interpretation of the 1896 agreement for the construction and working of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Russia attempted to exercise

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7. Morse and MacNair, "Far Eastern International Relations," p.520



The first of these is the fact that the Chinese government has been unable to carry out its policy of non-alignment in the face of the pressure exerted by the United States and its allies. This is due to the fact that the Chinese government has been unable to maintain its independence in the face of the pressure exerted by the United States and its allies. This is due to the fact that the Chinese government has been unable to maintain its independence in the face of the pressure exerted by the United States and its allies.

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exclusive jurisdiction over both the Chinese and the foreigners at Harbin and at other settlements in the railway zone.<sup>8</sup> Russia claimed she had political control over every one living in the area, because of the clause of the agreement of 1896 which gave her "absolute and exclusive right of administration of its lands." China refused to recognize this interpretation, and the United States claimed the terms of the contract applied only to business administration and railway development, but that the political administration still remained in the hands of China.

The matter was finally settled by an agreement signed by Russia and China on May 10, 1909. In this agreement Russia acknowledged China's sovereignty in the railway area and China agreed to the establishment of municipal councils in the zone. The inhabitants of the municipalities might elect delegates who should choose an Executive Committee to carry out all resolutions decided upon at the meetings of all the residents. The right to vote was to be based on ownership of real estate or the payment of fixed annual rental. The Assembly of delegates would have the authority to deal with all local matters of public concern. They would also have the power to determine the regulations in regard to police and the amount of taxes to be assessed.<sup>9</sup>

The Powers refused to approve of this agreement for they felt it

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8. M.T.Z. Tyau, "Legal Obligations Arising out of Treaty Relations between China and Other States," p. 17

9. W.W. Willoughby, "Foreign Rights and Interests in China," pp. 164, 165



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2. W. W. Willoughby, "Foreign Rights and Interests in China," pp. 166, 168.  
3. W. W. Willoughby, "Legal Obligations Arising out of Treaty Relations  
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gave the mixed municipalities too much power over the subjects of the foreign governments. The question was not finally settled with the Powers until 1914. At that time Great Britain came to an agreement with Russia. She agreed that the taxes for municipal and public purposes for the common good might be collected from the British subjects living in the railway zone. The British subjects were to be able to enjoy the same privileges as the Russian subjects and would be entitled to benefit from any more favored treatment given to subjects of other Powers.<sup>10</sup>

Russia asked the French government to recognize the obligation on the part of its subjects, in the railway zone, to observe the municipal regulations and to pay the taxes levied. France consented as did all the other Powers during 1914, except the United States, who refused to accept the arrangement. United States insisted that the payment of taxes of the American citizens was to be voluntary and was to be made through the American Consul.

#### Russo-Japanese Convention of 1910

In 1909 Americans who had been watching the struggle over concessions and spheres of influence in China became concerned over affairs in Manchuria. On November 6, 1909 a plan was sent to the British Foreign Office outlining a scheme for neutralizing the railways of Manchuria. Mr. Philander C. Knox, the secretary of state, had suggested this plan, which was to enable China to purchase the Russian and Japanese railways in Manchuria with a loan made to her for that

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10. Manchurian Treaties, pp. 153 and 154



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<sup>10</sup> Manchurian Treaties, pp. 133 and 134

purpose by the Powers. After the purchase the roads were to be supervised by those countries. This, he felt, would bring about a cooperative feeling which would be substituted for the feeling of rivalry and suspicion. England was in sympathy with the plan but felt that she could do nothing because of her agreement with Russia in 1899.<sup>11</sup> When the plan was presented to the other Powers, China and Germany favored the plan but Russia, Japan and France refused flatly to have anything to do with the scheme. Russia answered, "as nothing threatens either the sovereignty or the open-door policy in Manchuria,"....."it must declare with absolute frankness that the establishment of an international administration and control of the Manchurian railways would seriously injure the Russian interests, both public and private, to which the Imperial Government attaches capital importance."<sup>12</sup>

Instead of helping the situation in Manchuria and furthering the policy of integrity of China, the Knox neutralization scheme brought Russia and Japan closer together and resulted in a new understanding, which gave joint action for the protection of their common interests. Russia and Japan brought pressure upon China. On February 2, 1910, a note was sent to China warning her not to discuss projects of this type without first consulting them and on February 8, 1910, Russia sent a note saying, "In regard to all future railways in Manchuria which China may propose to build with borrowed capital, the Russian government must be

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11. See p. 50

12. V.H.Yakhontoff, "Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East," p. 105



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11. See p. 80

12. V.K. Yakovlev, "Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East," p. 103

first consulted."<sup>13</sup>

On July 4, 1910 Russia and Japan drew up the second agreement which still further strengthened their friendship. This convention made the two countries allies for maintaining the status quo in Manchuria and their special interests became really spheres of political activity. Articles II and III show how strong this alliance was becoming.<sup>14</sup>

Article II. Each of the High Contracting Parties engages to maintain and to respect the status quo in Manchuria as it results from all the treaties, conventions or other arrangements hitherto concluded, either between Russia and Japan or between these two Powers and China. Copies of the aforesaid arrangements have been exchanged between Russia and Japan.

Article III. In case any event of such a nature as to menace the above mentioned status quo should be brought about, the two High Contracting Parties will in each instance enter into communication with each other, for the purpose of agreeing upon the measures that they may judge it necessary to take for the maintenance of the said status quo.

A secret agreement was also drawn up in 1910 in which both parties agreed; (1) to refrain from all political activities in the sphere of the other party; (2) not to seek any privilege or concession in the other parties sphere which would harm their special interests; and (3) to respect all rights that each party had received in the sphere by treaty or by convention.

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13. Willoughby, p. 185

14. Manchurian Treaties, p. 141



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13. Willoughby, p. 185

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### Russo-Japanese Alliance, 1916

During the World War, Japan presented in 1915 the Twenty-one Demands to China. This created strong opposition among the powers but at that time, they were unable to make any objections for they were powerless to enforce them, due to the serious activities in Europe. Japan and Russia took the opportunity to still further strengthen their position in Manchuria and Mongolia by signing a new agreement on July 3, 1916. In order to prevent any future possibility of dispute from Germany, United States, Great Britain, or any other power, they issued this warning which was practically a military alliance between Russia and Japan for the preservation of peace in the Far East. This Convention announced that the two countries, in order to keep peace in the East agreed not to enter combinations that were hostile or that they would not oppose each other in any political combination and it pledged each other support and cooperation in case the interests of either party were threatened.

The following two Articles of the secret treaty of 1916<sup>15</sup> bound the two parties still more closely by the agreement to oppose any third party that should try to dominate China. This treaty applied not only to Manchuria, but to all China.

Article I. Both the High Contracting Parties recognize that the vital interests of one and the other of them require the safeguarding of China from the political dominion of any third Power whatsoever,

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15. Willoughby, p. 211



Manchu-Japanese Alliance, 1915

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Article I. Both the High Contracting Parties recognize that the vital interests of one and the other of them reside in safeguarding of China from the political domination of any third power whatsoever.

having hostile designs against Russia or Japan; and therefore mutually obligate themselves in the future at all times when circumstances demand, to enter upon open-hearted dealings, based on complete trust, in order to take necessary measures with the object of preventing the possibility of occurrence of said state of affairs.

Article II. In the event, in consequence of measures taken by mutual consent of Russia and Japan, on the basis of the preceding article, a declaration of war is made by any third Power contemplated by Article II of this agreement, against one of the Contracting Powers, the other Party, at the first demand of its ally, must come to its aid. Each of the High Contracting Parties herewith covenants, in the event such a condition arises, not to conclude peace with the common enemy, without preliminary consent therefor from its ally.

Neither party, however, was bound to aid the other "unless it be given guarantees by its allies that the latter will give it assistance corresponding in character to the importance of the approaching conflict."<sup>16</sup> This agreement was to last for a period of five years but would continue unless it was denounced by one of the two parties.

The treaty of 1907, bound the parties to respect the independence and territorial integrity of China, the treaty of 1910 established

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16. Morse and MacNair, p. 588



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cooperation and the determination to defend the status quo in Manchuria and the agreement of 1916 added Mongolia to the spheres and opposed any attempt of a third party to extend political domination over China.

Russo-Japanese relations had in the early part of the century been dominated by feelings of suspicion, and intrigue which led to war, but between 1905 and 1916 the relations had reached a stage of mutual understanding and growing confidence for future friendship.

### Russia in Mongolia

Before the Russo-Japanese War, Russia was interested in Mongolia only for commercial and economic reasons, but after the war was over she became interested for political reasons. Russia had tried to maintain buffer states between herself and China. She had recently lost most of her power in Manchuria and now she made a special effort to defend her interests in Mongolia. Her policy was mainly aggressive but it was for a defensive purpose, for Chinese colonization in Mongolia had been increasing greatly since 1909. Russia had always been fearful of Siberia being overrun with Chinese emigrants. The Russian peasant had no chance of competing with the low standard of the Chinese laborer. Outer Mongolia had many well-watered valleys, dense forests and a great deal of mineral wealth. If the Chinese once established themselves in the fertile valleys, Russia was afraid that the political frontier would be swept aside and her interests in Mongolia seriously threatened.

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Petersburg with China which had given her privileges of great value in Mongolia. The privileges of being able to have consuls in Mongolia and Turkestan, and having their merchants carry on frontier trade free from duty within a thirty-three mile limit, had stimulated Russian penetration in Mongolia. As their interest increased they pictured an independent Mongolian state under Russian influence. This would be a valuable asset in the future for Russia's imperialistic designs for economic control of China.<sup>18</sup> Some of the Mongols had become Russian subjects although they kept their own language and customs. The treaty of 1881 had been renewed in 1891 and again in 1901. It was due to be renewed in 1911. It was over this renewal that Russia and China disagreed and trouble started in which Russia was glad to uphold Mongolian interests.

China, between 1881 and 1909, had made very little attempt to colonize Mongolian territory, especially Outer Mongolia which is nearest to Russia. It was wild territory and was separated from Inner Mongolia by the Gobi Desert. By 1909, however, many Chinese were going into Outer Mongolia as a result of a colonization scheme to build up trade and railway construction.<sup>19</sup> China had allowed Mongolia to have autonomous local governments but maintained a resident and a military governor at Urga. Outer Mongolia had a population of 500,000 Mon-

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17. See p. 22

18. L.Pasvol'sky, "Russia in the Far East," p. 53

19 - Yakhontoff, p. 75



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golians, 200,000 Chinese and 5,000 Russians.<sup>20</sup> When the Chinese merchants, officials and settlers emigrated into Mongolia between 1909 - 1911, the native princes became alarmed. The Chinese merchants took advantage of the Mongols and made them loans at high rates of interest on the security of their lands. Then, when they were unable to pay, they seized the territory. In 1910 and 1911 the Chinese government attempted to interfere with the autonomy of the Mongol chiefs and tried to introduce reforms. Garrisons were set up and a strict administrative system was introduced. The Mongols were taxed, made to give military service and furnish supplies to officials.

The attempt to bring Mongolia under Chinese control came too late to be accepted by the Mongols. The princes of the country held a conference and appealed to Russia for aid. Trade between Russia and Mongolia had built up a strong feeling of interest between the two peoples. Centers of trade had been built up at Kiakhta on the Russian side and at Maimachen on the Mongolian side. The Mongol leaders now asked Russia to assist them in gaining their freedom from China, whom they felt had begun to impose an oppressive and despotic rule.

Russia had in this appeal another ideal chance to strengthen her power in Mongolia. China was having trouble with outbreaks at home, which resulted in the Chinese Revolution of 1911, and could not keep troops in Mongolia to protect her interests. The Mongols, due to the weakened condition of China, held a second conference and declared the

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20. American Journal of Law, v. 10, 1916



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complete independence of Outer Mongolia. She claimed that the overthrow of Manchu rulers in China freed them from allegiance to China, as it had been the Manchus who had conquered Mongolia. Russia gave a great deal of aid and encouragement to the new government but did not actually recognize it as she was afraid of alarming the Powers. She denied having any territorial designs in Mongolia but claimed that her desire was to mediate between China and Mongolia.<sup>21</sup> She wanted peace and trade. Mongolian trade itself was not so important but the trade route through Mongolia for the importation of tea to Russia from the Yang-Tse valley was an important part of Russian trade.

However, in 1912 Russia took definite steps to increase her influence. On September 6, 1912, Russia announced that China had failed to give notice for the termination of the treaty of 1881 and therefore she considered it still in force for another ten years<sup>22</sup> but she would abolish the zone of free trade on the Russian side of the frontier on January 1, 1913.<sup>23</sup> Russia also, in November, 1912, entered into an agreement with Mongolia as an independent country thus recognizing the autonomy of Mongolia. By this treaty Russia agreed to assist Mongolia to maintain their autonomy and to break the hold of Peking. She also agreed to help prohibit the admission of Chinese colonizers and troops. In return Mongolia gave to the Russians many rights and privileges of

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21. Morse and MacNair, p. 565

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23. Manchurian Treaties, p. 115



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trade. These included freedom of travel and navigation, the right to lease and own property, to engage in fishing, mining and lumbering and freedom from customs duties. The treaty also confirmed Russian rights in Mongolia and provided that no rights should be granted to foreign nationals that were not granted to Russians. In January, 1913, the sovereigns of Tibet and Mongolia recognized each other as rulers of independent countries.

The new government in China had refused to recognize the autonomy of Mongolia and protested against this treaty between Russia and Mongolia. However, due to the strong support of Mongolia by Russia, China was obliged to recognize the autonomy. This was done through a Russo-Chinese understanding made November 5, 1913. Representatives of the governments signed the agreement, by which Russia recognized the suzerainty of China in Outer Mongolia and China recognized the autonomy of Outer Mongolia. China was not to intervene in the internal matters of commerce and industry and would not maintain civil or military officials or troops in the country or attempt further colonization. China also agreed to consult Russia on any political and territorial problems in Outer Mongolia and the Mongolian authorities were to take part in the consultations.

The outbreak of the World War in 1914 gave Russia still another chance for increased power. On September 30, 1914, Russia signed another agreement with Mongolia which gave her a concession for the building of a telegraph line and pledged Mongolia to consult Russia before making any railway concessions. This gave Russia practically



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complete control of the railway policy of Outer Mongolia and safeguarded her frontier.

The three countries of Russia, China and Outer Mongolia now planned an agreement which became known as the Tripartite Agreement. It was signed June 7, 1915 at Kiakhta. In this treaty the countries came to the following agreements:<sup>24</sup>

1. Outer Mongolia recognized Chinese suzerainty.
2. China had treaty making power in political and territorial questions but Mongolia could make commercial and industrial treaties.
3. Russia and China recognized the autonomy of Outer Mongolia and promised to abstain from all internal administration of Mongolia.
4. There was to be no customs duties on either Chinese or Russian imports.
5. China was to consult Russia on all political questions concerning Outer Mongolia.
6. Chinese residents were to be under Chinese jurisdiction and Russian residents under Russian jurisdiction. Mixed cases were to be tried in mixed courts.

This treaty practically placed Outer Mongolia under the joint protection of China and Russia and made Outer Mongolia a buffer state between Russia and China. It remained in force until 1917. After the Russian Revolution, China took advantage of the Russian collapse and disregarded the Kiakhta convention and re-established her

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24. S.A. Korff, "Russia's Foreign Relations During the Last Half Century," pp. 73 and 74



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sovereignty over Mongolia. However, in 1921, the Bolsheviks assisted the Mongols, China was driven out again and in 1924 a republican government on the Soviet model and under Soviet influence was established and Mongolia became a semi-independent country nominally federated with China but influenced, if not actually controlled, by Soviet Russia.<sup>25</sup>

#### Early Expansion

During the early period of the Russian Revolution, and in later years thereafter, with the aid of the Bolsheviks, led a peaceful expansion through various areas from the coast of the Pacific. A partial illustration of the growth of Russia was given during this period by China to prevent Russian raids. She did not dream that the treaties of 1689 and 1727 were the beginnings of a long history of political and commercial expansion and conquest.

#### Expansion Through Friendship

Ukraine brought about the final sanctioning of Russian control of these areas in southern Siberia by the treaties of 1858 and 1860. This sanction was probably received quicker by Ukraine than it would have been by others because he did not make any efforts to make settlements in territory where China would feel that the Russians were aggressively encroaching upon Chinese territory. He was aided, however, by the fact that China had more vital interests at stake in other parts of her Empire.

The victory of Japan over China opened the door of Russia to the danger of a strong competing power in Manchuria. It led to her successful attempt to get the cooperation of other European countries in preventing Japan from getting a stronghold in Manchuria at Port Arthur.



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22. H. P. P. "A Brief Diplomatic Account of Events in Mongolia," p. 33

## VI. SUMMARY

The situation in Siberian Russia in 1917 was the result of many years of effort on the part of Russian leaders, some of whom had advocated quiet penetration and friendly alliances, while others had attempted aggressive steps to gain power and control in both unclaimed lands and also in territories claimed by other powers.

### Early Penetration

During the early period Yermak, and in later years Muraviev, with Nevelskoy's aid, led a peaceful expansion through unclaimed areas from the Urals to the Pacific. A partial legalization of the position of Russia was granted during this period by China to prevent Cossack raids. She did not dream that the treaties of 1689 and 1727 were the beginnings of a long history of political and commercial expansion and conquest.

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The victory of Japan over China opened the eyes of Russia to the danger of a strong competing power in Manchuria. It led to her unsuccessful attempt to get the cooperation of other European countries in preventing Japan from getting a stronghold in Manchuria at Port Arthur.

The next character to dominate Russian policy in the Far East was Count Witte, who stood strongly for peaceful economic expansion. His influence brought about the secret treaty of 1896, the establishment of the Russo-Chinese Bank, and the Chinese Eastern Railway Company through which he hoped to have a Russian control over financial enterprises in the Far East. His insistence on maintaining a peaceful policy led to conflict with those in Russia who were gaining influence with the Czar and who advocated a more aggressive policy.

#### Period of Aggression

The rush for concessions in China in 1898 was started by Germany's receiving the grant of Kiaochow. This was one of the periods when the policy of Russia was stated to the foreign countries by two different authorities. The Czar agreed to allow Germany to take the territory, but made no attempt to notify Witte, who was Minister of Foreign Affairs, of his statement. Witte did not know of it until after those who desired to carry out the aggressive policy and seize Port Arthur, had made plans, agreed to by the Czar, to take the territory. This was an act absolutely opposite to all aims and plans of the Russian Foreign Minister and led eventually to his loss of power.

The foreign policy of the military leaders, Kuropatkin and Alexeiev between 1898 and 1900, included the seizing of Port Arthur and the expansion of military power in Manchuria during the Boxer uprising in spite of her declaration on the Open Door Policy and her promises to evacuate Manchuria. During the Boxer trouble Russia represented herself as an ally to the Powers and as a friend to China while she was making herself a master of Manchuria by increasing her military power. This led to the



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Anglo-Japanese alliance and the Russo-Chinese agreement during the year 1902, but these agreements did not bring about the withdrawal of Russian aggressive policy. Instead the aggressiveness continued until it brought on the Russo-Japanese War.

#### Policy of Conciliation and Defense

Russia, now finding that her aggression was not possible against such a powerful competitor, changed her tactics and by political conventions and secret agreements became an ally of Japan in the defense of their positions in Manchuria. This was easily done for wars between countries having autocratic governments might better be called wars between the leaders who formed the policies of the country, therefore a change in the policy of the leaders changes enemies to friends, all of which is done without any regard as to the feelings of the people of the countries.

Russian policy in Mongolia was also a defensive policy for she wanted Mongolia as a buffer state and her fear between 1909 - 1915 was of the gradual increase of Chinese colonization and power in Mongolia which would mean too much danger to the Russian boundary. A buffer state cannot continue to exist when either of the powers become desirous of expanding for that expansion is a challenge to the other power whose interests are established in the buffer state. The decision of 1915 was an agreement between the two interested states and the Mongols themselves over the powers that each should have so that Mongolia might exist and peace be maintained in the territory. By this agreement Russia retained the greatest control, but whether this state continues indefinitely depends upon Russia's method of control and the attitude of Mongolia and China.



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